

Effects of Race on Attitudes toward International Trade: Economics or Symbolic Politics?

Diana C. Mutz,¹ Edward D. Mansfield,² Eunji Kim³

In multiple representative national surveys of American attitudes toward trade, minorities have been found to hold more favorable attitudes toward international trade than whites. This finding is puzzling in part because minorities are more likely to experience unemployment than whites. Moreover, the position of minorities in the national income and education distribution makes them an unlikely source of support for trade. In this study, we document the racial gap in trade opinions, drawing on multiple data sets spanning over a decade. In addition, we utilize decomposition analysis to examine why minorities are more supportive of trade than whites. In addition to economic theories, we draw on psychological explanations for trade support to solve this puzzle. Finally, using an extremely large national survey, we begin to disentangle which minority groups appear most likely to drive this effect.

¹ Samuel A. Stouffer Professor of Political Science and Communication and Director of the Institute for the Study of Citizens and Politics, University of Pennsylvania, mutz@upenn.edu.

² Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science and Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics, University of Pennsylvania, emansfie@sas.upenn.edu.

³ Joint Ph.D. Student in Political Science and Communication, University of Pennsylvania, eunjikim@upenn.edu.

Despite widespread agreement among economists that open trade promotes the efficient allocation of resources and growth, Americans have displayed considerable ambivalence about overseas commerce. A burgeoning literature has analyzed the economic, political, and psychological bases of trade attitudes, but has paid little attention to differences among ethnic and racial groups. In fact, race and ethnicity are not even among the control variables included in most of these analyses.

In this study, we argue that there are important variations in trade attitudes between white Americans and Americans who are ethnic and racial minorities. More specifically, we hypothesize and find consistent evidence across various surveys that minorities are more supportive of trade than whites. These results reflect the fact that minorities are younger, less nationalistic, less prejudiced, and less likely to live in areas with a heavy manufacturing base than whites. Further, we find that minority support for globalization is not limited to trade. Minorities are also substantially more supportive of offshore outsourcing than whites. Despite being a less-educated and lower income segment of the population than whites, minorities hold more favorable views of globalization, primarily for psychological rather than economic reasons.

These results have important implications. The 2012 United States Census revealed that over half of all children under the age of 5 are non-white. By 2043, whites are expected to comprise less than half of the American population. That minorities are less hostile to trade than whites suggests that this demographic shift might contribute to increased mass support for globalization. In the face of widespread concern that public opposition to globalization contributed to the election of Donald Trump and may contribute to the rollback of various trade agreements, heightened protectionism, and a more isolationist stance on the part of the U.S., it is crucial to obtain a fuller understanding of what drives American public opinion on trade.

Minorities and Trade

At first blush, there are various reasons to expect racial and ethnic minorities to be more protectionist than whites. Chief among them is material self-interest. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem, for example, suggests that in countries such as the U.S.—with an abundance of highly skilled workers relative to the rest of the world—trade disproportionately benefits high-skill labor and harms low-skill labor (Stolper and Samuelson 1941; Leamer 1984). Various studies have concluded that these distributional consequences of trade shape Americans' attitudes about overseas commerce, with lower skilled individuals holding less favorable opinions than higher skilled people (O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda and Rodrik 2005). Based on both of the typical measures of skill—formal education and occupational wages—minorities tend to be lower skilled than whites, and thus should be more protectionist.

Minorities also tend to be more economically vulnerable than whites. They experience higher rates of unemployment, live in areas marked by higher unemployment rates, and have lower incomes on average. Each of these factors might generate protectionist sentiment (Bohara and Kaempfer 1991; Irwin 2005; Bown and Crowley 2013). Further, minorities tend to have less economic knowledge than whites. Previous research has found that individuals who understand the principles of economics are more likely to support trade than individuals with less economic knowledge, suggesting another explanation for why minorities might be more protectionist than whites (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006).

While there are various material and educational reasons why minorities might be protectionist, there are psychological reasons why they might be *more* supportive of trade than whites. One reason is that minorities tend to display lower levels of prejudice than whites. Minorities are less likely to exhibit ingroup favoritism and negative attitudes toward outgroups.

With respect to both prejudice toward specific minorities and ethnocentrism—that is, prejudice, broadly conceived—minorities are less prone to negative outgroup stereotypes than majority whites. Minority group members are generally more accepting of majority group members than majority group members are of minorities. For example, 62 percent of white Americans report that they would accept a Black person marrying into their family and over 70 percent would do so if the person is Asian or Hispanic. However, 83 percent of Blacks would accept a white, an Asian, or a Hispanic marrying into their family. Blacks are therefore over 20 percentage points more accepting of whites than whites are of Blacks (Davenport 2017).

Evidence about residential preferences reveals a similar pattern. whites' willingness to move into a neighborhood is negatively related to the density of Blacks living there, but Blacks prefer integrated neighborhoods that incorporate ingroup as well as outgroup members (Farley, Fielding, and Krysan 2010). The urban-rural divide also corresponds to racial attitudes. Given that minorities are more likely to reside in urban areas than whites, and urban areas are also more racially diverse, those living outside metropolitan areas may prefer less racial diversity as well as less international trade. Even if minorities do not identify with outgroups from other countries, they may—by virtue of having experienced minority status—have less prejudiced attitudes. In the U.S., whites are viewed by both Blacks and Hispanics as a higher status group than their own group, so they generally do not assert superiority over the white outgroup. As Brewer (2007: 733) notes, they are responding to objective differences in power, status, and wealth.

Ethnocentrism has thus been described as a “one way street,” in which only dominant groups demonstrate consistent ingroup bias and outgroup prejudice (Tajfel 1982). In Kam and Kinder's (2009: 49) assessment of ethnocentrism, Blacks offered similar evaluations of Blacks and whites, whereas whites assessed themselves far more positively than Blacks. Thus, the tendency

to evaluate outgroups more negatively than ingroups is expressed by high status majority groups toward lower status minority groups, but not the reverse.

Although it is not intuitively obvious why this is relevant to attitudes toward the international flow of goods and services, aversion to difference appears to be highly generalizable. Ethnocentric individuals are particularly hostile to trade (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Sabet 2013; Mutz and Kim 2017). Even when it is products rather than people crossing borders, the same general principles apply: similarity between the domestic population and people in a foreign country encourages more positive views toward trading with that country (Mutz 2015).

A second psychological reason why minorities might be more supportive of trade than whites stems from differences in their perceptions of national superiority. A number of studies have found that a heightened sense of national superiority reduces support for various aspects of economic globalization (O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Mansfield and Mutz 2013). Across a wide range of countries, O'Rourke and Sinnott (2001) and Mayda and Rodrik (2005) find that hostility toward trade rises together with people's sense of national superiority.

Minorities generally perceive less national superiority than whites, both in the U.S. and elsewhere (Elkins and Sides 2007; Theiss-Morse 2009; Cebotari 2015; Carter and Pérez 2016). Because whites tend to have higher status than non-whites in the U.S., it is not surprising that whites feel a stronger sense of national superiority; members of the nation's dominant group often feel more ownership of the nation than lower-status groups (Sidanius et al. 1997). Non-whites' lower standing in the racial order reduces their sense of national belonging. Further, discrimination against non-whites often strengthens their identification with their own ethnicity, rather than with the nation, and thus undermines their national pride. Given that national

superiority is linked to protectionism, variations in national attachment between whites and minorities may help to account for minorities' pro-trade views.⁴

In addition to psychological factors, employment and social context may contribute to a tendency for non-whites to exhibit greater support for trade. First, much of the anti-trade sentiment expressed in the U.S. focuses on the pressure that foreign competition exerts on the American manufacturing sector and the effects of job loss in that sector. Non-whites comprise less of the manufacturing workforce than they do of the population as a whole. Blacks, for example, make up over 13 percent of the population, but only 10 percent of the manufacturing workforce. Latinos and Hispanics make up almost 18 percent of the population, but only about 16 percent of this workforce (U.S. Census Bureau 2016; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017). Hence, it is possible that non-whites express greater support for trade than whites because they are less likely to work in sectors that have been adversely affected by overseas commerce.

Second, it is also possible that social context may contribute to differences in trade support. In heavy manufacturing areas, media coverage and political rhetoric tend to emphasize trade's harmful effects, regardless of individual self-interest based on employment (Guisinger 2017). An individual might dislike the impact of declining manufacturing employment on his or her community, even if he or she is not personally affected.

Beyond manufacturing employment and residential context, the demographics of the minority population may also promote pro-trade attitudes. In the U.S., the median age of non-whites is 31 years, whereas the median age of whites is 43 (Gao 2016). This large age difference is typically attributed to the higher birth rate among minorities than whites. Since younger

⁴ Some research has also linked depressed national attachment among non-Whites to economic conditions and discrimination (Cebotari 2015). Minorities tend to be poorer than Whites and their adverse economic conditions may lead them to withdraw support for the nation. However, this does not appear to be a necessary condition for low levels of national superiority among minorities.

individuals are generally more supportive of trade than their older counterparts, youth may also contribute to greater trade support among minorities (e.g., Mayda and Rodrik 2005).

A Preliminary Empirical Analysis

To begin, we analyze whether there are differences in attitudes toward trade between whites and non-whites using multiple surveys, all of which are based on representative national probability samples of the U.S. These include: (1) a series of Chicago Council on Global Affairs surveys conducted from 1998 to 2017; (2) a survey conducted in 2007 by GfK, Ltd. (Mansfield and Mutz 2009), (3) 2013 and 2016 surveys sponsored by the Institute for the Study of Citizens and Politics (ISCAP), and (4) the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES). Each of these surveys included items on trade and other aspects of economic globalization that are reported in Appendix A. Importantly, these studies were conducted using different interview modes, different survey organizations, and some surveys were exclusively in English while others were conducted in multiple languages. To the extent that a pattern emerges despite these variations, it lends greater credibility to our findings.

In surveys that include multiple items tapping trade, the extremely high inter-correlations among items led us to combine them into a single, highly reliable index. This approach is preferable to repeated analyses of individual items because single items may produce idiosyncratic results (Hoyle, Harris, and Judd 2001; Liu 2004; Hiscox 2006). By combining multiple measures, extraneous content specific to any individual question is cancelled out, thus producing both a more reliable measure of the underlying construct of interest, and results that do not depend on any single framing of questions about trade preferences. For each survey, we converted each item on trade to a variable with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Then we combined these items by taking their mean, and converted them to 0-1 scale.

In addition to items addressing general trade support, we also drew on questions asking about support for specific trade agreements such as NAFTA, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). Although specific trade agreements obviously differ, to the extent that we observe the same general pattern in public opinion across various agreements, it lends support to our overall thesis. Questions about specific trade agreements are drawn from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs surveys from 2008 to 2017.

Each survey asked respondents to identify their race as white, Black or African-American, or another category. A separate question asked about Latino or Hispanic ethnicity. To preserve adequate sample size, we initially distinguish between whites and all other races and ethnicities, taken as a single group.

In Figure 1, we examine differences by race for each indicator. The findings are strikingly consistent. Despite variations in these surveys, non-whites are always more supportive of international trade, and the difference is statistically significant. This pattern remains true of general trade support, shown on the left of Figure 1, as well as support for specific trade agreements, as illustrated on the right side of Figure 1.

[Figure 1 here]

In Figure 2, we draw on the Chicago Council on Global Affairs surveys that include identical questions asked over time in order to examine the timing and persistence of this pattern. As shown in the top panel of Figure 2, in response to a question asking if globalization is mostly good or mostly bad for the American economy, the difference between minorities and whites is not significant until 2004. Beginning in 2004, however, minorities are consistently more pro-globalization than whites and, with the exception of 2006, this difference is statistically significant. As shown in the lower panel of Figure 2, a similar pattern exists when people are

asked whether international trade is good or bad for the American economy. This question was only asked in 2004, 2006, 2016, and 2017, but minorities are significantly more pro-trade than whites in the latter two surveys. It appears that this pattern emerged in the mid to late 2000s, and has persisted since that time. Importantly, it is not purely a result of the recent Republican embrace of anti-trade views during the 2016 presidential election. Minorities are more likely to be Democrats, and minorities were highly unlikely to be Trump supporters in 2016, thus naturally aligning themselves with the somewhat more pro-trade Democratic stances in 2016. But this pattern precedes the 2016 election, and thus has earlier roots.

[Figure 2 here]

Minorities also exhibit greater support for aspects of economic globalization beyond trade. The online probability survey conducted in 2007 by GfK, Ltd. included three items (reported in Appendix A) on attitudes toward “offshore outsourcing,” which occurs when a domestic firm contracts with a foreign firm for goods or services in the production process (Mansfield and Mutz 2013). As shown in Figure 3, minorities display a significantly more favorable view of offshore outsourcing than whites, based on each of these items.

[Figure 3 here]

The relationship between race and trade attitudes has generated little scholarly attention to date, perhaps because it was assumed, based on the dominant theories of trade preferences, that minorities should be more opposed to trade due to their greater economic vulnerability. For example, Guisinger (2017: chap. 4) suggests that, over the period from 1986 to 2012, white Americans had more favorable views of trade than minorities. In reconciling these results with the consistent pattern we observe above, it is important to note that her conclusion is based on 10 surveys conducted over this period, but that minorities were significantly more protectionist

than whites only in the 1986, 1988, and 1996 surveys. Since our results are based on surveys conducted since 1998, they do not necessarily contradict Guisinger's observations.

Statistical significance notwithstanding, it is troubling that the percentage of minorities who are positively disposed toward trade is consistently higher in our analyses than in analyses based on the American National Election Studies (ANES) trade question used by Guisinger. We suspect this is an outgrowth of the less than ideal trade question in the ANES. Respondents were asked, "Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to protect American jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and hurt American exports. Do you FAVOR or OPPOSE placing new limits on imports?" The item presents a double negative, in which favoring limits means opposing trade and opposing limits means favoring trade. Respondent confusion is clear in the unusually high number of "don't know" responses to this question (30-50 percent, depending on the year), a problem that does not exist in other contemporaneously-asked trade questions.⁵ In addition, this item violates well-established norms for survey questions by informing respondents that favoring limits will protect American jobs, and that opposing limits will raise consumer prices and hurt American exports. These arguments may or may not be balanced or accurate, but it is problematic and contrary to best practices to offer arguments pro or con in the context of asking a question.⁶ Given these concerns and the results presented in Figures 1, 2, and 3, it seems likely that current public opinion, if not past opinion, leans toward greater minority support for trade as shown across multiple surveys and questions in Figures 1, 2 and 3. Taken together, the available evidence strongly suggests that a racial gap has emerged over the past decade, with minorities exhibiting greater support for trade and globalization than whites.

⁵ For example, in the Chicago Council on Global Affairs 2008 survey, only 2.4 percent could not respond to the trade question, whereas over 40 percent of respondents could not answer the ANES question on limiting imports.

⁶ See O'Rourke and Sinnott (2001) for similar concerns.

Methods

Having documented this difference thoroughly, we next turn to explaining the difference in trade attitudes between whites and minorities. To do so, we take advantage of three of our nationally representative probability surveys. We chose these three surveys for further analyses because they are rich in measures of the many possible explanations for white-minority differences. In addition, they tap white and minority opinions in the aftermath of the racial gap's emergence roughly a decade ago. By using surveys with measures of many possible explanations, we allow simultaneous testing of multiple explanations for the racial gap in trade preferences.

In prior research, the most common methodological approach to addressing issues such as explaining group differences has been to control for additional characteristics of whites and minorities to determine if those characteristics, either singly or in combination, produce a model in which minority status no longer exerts a statistically significant influence on trade preferences. This approach is straightforward and reasonable. If a difference between whites and minorities in some independent variable accounts for the impact of race, then researchers can conclude that this factor “explains away” the race effect.

But this approach is also problematic because as a regression model grows more complex, race may cease to be a significant predictor due simply to declining degrees of freedom. Further, this approach does not take into account the fact that whites and minorities may differ not only in their *mean levels* of some factor that influences trade preferences, but also in the extent to which a group relies on one factor more heavily than another when forming trade preferences. For example, as Gidengil (1995) argued, men may weigh economic factors more heavily than social attitudes in forming trade attitudes, whereas women may do the reverse. Similar differences may occur across racial groups.

Gidengil identified both types of variation by using decomposition methods, an approach developed by labor economists to explain the origins of differences between groups (e.g., Oaxaca 1973; Card and Krueger 1992; Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo 2010). This approach is designed to answer questions such as, “What are the most important explanations accounting for pay differences between whites and minorities?” Decomposition methods in public opinion research are useful in examining how mean differences in some factor account for a difference between groups, while also addressing whether the same factors are equally important in the attitude formation process for one group relative to the other. In this sense, they extend the range of possible explanations for group differences.

Decomposition methods are not without limitations in addressing why two groups differ on some outcome. Consequently, they are best viewed as ways of evaluating counterfactual scenarios in order to better understand group differences. For example, we noted earlier that, on average, minorities are less likely to work in manufacturing jobs than whites. If, however, minorities were equally likely to hold such jobs, would they then be expected to hold trade preferences more similar to those of whites? Decomposition can be used to construct various counterfactual scenarios, but this is not, strictly speaking, intended as a causal explanation. In other words, this technique cannot be used to demonstrate that, for example, encouraging whites to take more non-manufacturing jobs would necessarily eliminate the racial gap in trade preferences.

Nonetheless, decomposition is useful for quantifying the contribution of various factors to a difference in outcomes. As Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2010: 3) note, “By indicating which factors are quantitatively important and which are not . . . decompositions provide useful indications of particular hypotheses or explanations to be explored in more detail.”

Decompositions are a useful start toward this end because they provide quantitative estimates of the relative importance of particular explanatory factors.⁷

With these caveats in mind, our initial exploration proceeds in multiple steps. First, for each of our three surveys we estimate a pooled regression model of potential predictors of trade preferences, without including race. We then do likewise within the white and non-white subgroups that are part of the decomposition. These initial models are shown in Appendix C. Second, in order to reduce the model to relevant variables, we only retain predictors that reached the .10 level of significance in at least one of the three regression equations; that is, they need to be predictive either in the pooled sample as a whole, or within one or more of the two subgroups. These variables are then rescaled to range from -1 to +1.

Decomposition produces two estimates for each potential explanation for group differences. One estimate—termed the “composition component”—indicates how much the gap between groups would be reduced if the levels of that factor were identical for different racial and ethnic groups. If, for example, whites and minorities were equally likely to be employed in manufacturing, how much more hostile would minorities’ trade preferences be? The second estimate—the “effect component”—quantifies the difference between how the two groups weight that factor in forming trade preferences for a person holding an average value on that factor. Importantly, in this case, “average” does not necessarily imply what a pooled sample

⁷ Decomposition results are ideally designed for scenarios in which the potential explanatory factors have “neutral” values (that is, values which are expected to neither promote nor discourage positive attitudes toward trade), while values on either side of the neutral value push trade preferences in opposing directions. In some cases, one can make such an argument for the kind of explanatory factors we use to explain trade preferences. For example, identifying as a Republican could drive trade preferences one direction, and identifying as a Democrat could drive them in the opposite direction; but we would not expect independents to be influenced one way or the other, thus creating a “neutral” value. However, for most social science variables that might explain group differences, there is no meaningful neutral value.

would reveal as the means and coefficients, but rather what a person who is the unweighted average of what whites and minorities are like, ignoring their differing group sizes.

The equations for the Composition and Effect components are described in equations 1 and 2:

(1) Composition Component

$$\frac{(b_{non-white} + b_{white})}{2}(\bar{x}_{non-white} - \bar{x}_{white})$$

(2) Effect Component

$$\frac{(\bar{x}_{non-white} + \bar{x}_{white})}{2}(b_{non-white} - b_{white})$$

In these equations, we use adjust means for variables likely to be affected by temporally preceding variables. For example, social dominance orientation is known to be affected by gender, with men demonstrating higher levels of social dominance than women. As a result, we control for gender and other demographics when producing the adjusted mean for social dominance. This allows for the effects of gender to be registered by the more exogenous variable (in this case, gender) rather than the more proximate one (social dominance). To accomplish this, we rely on the estimated intercepts from equations using each potential explanation as the dependent variable, including all explanatory variables established to be prior to this variable.

In our results section, we calculate the composition and effect component for each potential explanatory factor within a survey, as well as their combined total. Examining the net value of the two components is important because a given variable might, by virtue of its composition component, increase the gap between racial groups, while the effect component for the same variable works to decrease the gap. In these cases, the net effect could be small, despite sizable composition and effect components.

We use these results to identify the most important variables in the decompositions; that is, those best able to account for differences between subgroups. Ultimately, our goal is to find the most parsimonious models explaining the racial gap within each survey, and thus to be able to provide a more broadly-based conclusion about why whites and minorities differ on trade. This study is a first step toward that end.

Data

The three surveys we use for these purposes have the advantage of including multiple-item indexes of trade preferences. Details on the date of each survey are included in Appendix B, but for purposes of referencing each of them, we will refer to them as the 2007 Mansfield-Mutz survey, the 2013 ISCAP survey, and the 2016 ISCAP Survey. Operationalizations of the potential explanatory variables for each survey are included in Appendix A. The initial models for each survey include a wide range of potential explanations for the racial gap, including a Racial Prejudice index (Kinder and Kam 2010) and an index of Social Dominance Orientation, an alternative measure of racism, and preference for racial hierarchy (Pratto et al. 1994). The 2016 survey also included an index of perceived Discrimination Against High Status Groups. Using a series of six separate questions, respondents were asked about the extent to which they thought whites, Blacks, Christians, Muslims, men, and women were discriminated against. The index represents the extent to which respondents view the higher status group (whites, Christians, and men) as being discriminated against more than the lower status groups (Blacks, Muslims, and women).

Further items include an index of Cosmopolitanism (Jackman and Vavreck 2011) and Perceived Welfare Success (that is, to what extent the respondent views the country as capable of taking care of the housing, healthcare, and nutritional needs of citizens experiencing hardship).

Respondents also were asked a battery of items measuring the perceived Legitimacy of the Political System (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990). The measures most closely related to trade included an Isolationism index (Maggiotto and Wittkopf 1981; Herrmann, Tetlock, and Diascro 2001), a Market Conservatism index (Zumbrunnen and Gangl 2008), and an index of Pro-Competition attitudes (Spence and Helmreich 1983), independent of the trade context. We also include one question about Willingness to Relocate for a job, and a multiple item index of perceived National Superiority (Rankin 2001).

Three well-known indexes of personality characteristics that might vary by race also are included as potential explanatory factors. Three questions tapped Social Trust, and another battery measured the respondent's Need for Certainty (Mannetti et al. 2002). A final personality characteristic, Empathy as a personality trait (Davis 1983), was also considered as a potential explanation for differences by race.

To tap potential differences in economic knowledge, we included whether the respondent had taken an Economics Course, and an index of Economic Knowledge. To assess differences between the positions of whites and minorities in the American workforce, we included whether the respondent works in an Export-Oriented Job (based on NAIC industry coding), the Average Occupational Wage for the respondent's occupation, and whether the respondent was personally Unemployed.

Demographic measures include Gender, Income, Education, and Age. Measures of residential social context include whether the respondent lives in a metropolitan versus a rural area, the Percentage Unemployment within the respondent's zip code, the Percentage Manufacturing Employment within the zip code, and the area's Median Income, all drawn from the U.S. Census. In addition, our models include Union membership and Party Identification on a traditional 7-point scale.

Importantly, not all models include all of these variables, but most are present in one or more surveys. Further, these potential explanations are consistently measured in highly reliable ways (see Appendix A for details). The full regression models in Appendix C show the results when all variables available from each survey are included. The variables that are not present in our decomposition analyses were eliminated because they did not predict trade preferences in the population as a whole, among whites, or among non-whites.

Results of a Decomposition Analysis

Using the decomposition methods outlined above, we first identify composition effects; that is, indicators of the extent to which a variable differed in its mean level between racial groups, weighted by its pooled white-non-white regression coefficient. This furnishes a sense of whether the two racial groups would exhibit greater similarity or difference in trade attitudes if they were identical on a given variable.

Results based on the 2007 survey are shown in Table 1. The column labelled “Composition” indicates the extent to which differences between racial groups for each variable account for the racial gap in support for trade. Positive values indicate that the variable helps to explain the gap, whereas negative values indicate that the gap would be larger if the two groups were identical on that variable. The column labelled “Percent Composition” shows the size of this effect as a proportion of the total size of the gap between whites and non-whites in trade preferences. Because various predictors may contribute to both greater and lesser gaps between groups, the percentages are not constrained to add to 100 percent.

[Table 1 here]

As shown in the composition columns, if whites and non-whites had the same age profiles, there would be a substantial reduction in the gap in their levels of trade support.

Likewise, if whites tended to live in more diverse metropolitan areas rather than in rural areas, they and non-whites would be expected to have more similar views on trade. By the same metric, if non-whites lived in areas with a greater manufacturing base, their trade views would be expected to converge with those of whites. Interestingly, being employed in import-oriented versus export-oriented lines of work had very little influence. Nonetheless, living in an area with a heavy manufacturing base—even if an individual is not personally employed in manufacturing—strongly influences the gap in trade preferences. Finally, the fact that whites have higher levels of perceived National Superiority than non-whites helps to explain why they are more hostile to trade than non-whites.

The column labelled Effect in Table 1 represents the differential relevance of each variable to trade preferences for a person with a level of the variable equal to the value midway between the white and the Non-white averages. Although scholars differ on the appropriate way to interpret these values (Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo 2010), they are useful for revising our estimates of what factors play the most important role in explaining the racial gap in trade attitudes. Our initial assessments suggest that differences between white and non-whites in the amount of manufacturing that occurs in the area where they reside, national superiority, age, and whether they live in a more metropolitan or rural area are the key factors driving this gap.

However, the total column in Table 1—which accounts for both mean differences between whites and non-whites and how important these variables are to explaining trade preferences within each group—suggests that one additional factor is also crucial. Although differences in mean levels of prejudice (that is, racial ingroup favoritism) had only a modest impact in the composition column, when combined with the observation that whites weigh this factor much more heavily than non-whites when forming trade preferences, racial prejudice becomes much more central to the explanation for group differences. The economic factors in

Table 1 generate the opposite pattern of trade preferences, one in which non-whites should be more anti-trade than whites due to minorities' higher rates of unemployment and lower occupational wages.

Table 2 reports the decomposition findings for the 2013 survey. By 2013, there is a sizable positive composition effect for Isolationism, with whites systematically more isolationist than minorities, thus depressing trade support among whites. In addition, the higher levels of Social Dominance Orientation among whites stimulate lower levels of trade support relative to non-whites. Social Dominance taps prejudice toward outgroups along with a preference for group hierarchy over group equality. Consequently, this finding corresponds closely with the finding on racial prejudice in Table 1. In addition, based on the 2013 survey, if whites were as likely to be Democrats as non-whites, the racial gap in trade attitudes would decrease by roughly 12 percent. For most of the period since World War II, Republicans have promoted open trade and liberal trade policies to a greater extent than Democrats. By 2013, however, Democrats in the mass public were more pro-trade than Republicans, thus making the racial partisan division consistent with the division on trade attitudes.

[Table 2 here]

By 2016, changing partisan preferences with respect to trade had become even clearer. As shown in the composition column in Table 3, by then party identification is the strongest composition difference accounting for the racial gap in trade preferences. But a second source of the gap is again tied to racial attitudes. Respondents who perceive high status groups—men, Christians, and whites—as being discriminated against to a greater extent than lower status groups—women, Muslims, and African-Americans, respectively—are less likely to support trade. Because these individuals feel that they or their ingroup is oppressed by minorities, they harbor resentment toward people different from themselves. This sentiment is—perhaps not

surprisingly—far stronger among whites than non-whites. Our analyses suggest that if minorities perceived higher status groups to be discriminated against as much as whites think they are, then roughly 30 percent of the racial gap in trade preferences would be eliminated. Clearly, the sense that dominant whites, Christians, and men are not treated fairly by society feeds anti-trade sentiments among whites, but non-whites are much less likely to hold such perceptions.

[Table 3 here]

Another source of the gap in Table 3 is the difference in age between whites and non-whites. Because minorities tend to be significantly younger than whites in the U.S. and younger people tend to express greater support for trade with foreign countries, non-whites are more supportive of trade on the whole. Further, if whites lived in areas where the proportion of manufacturing employment is as low as is typically the case for non-whites, the gap in trade preferences would fall by about 10 percent.

In summary, the differences that help explain the racial gap in trade support are partially rooted in social context—particularly the fact that whites are more likely to reside in rural areas and areas with a relatively heavy manufacturing base. Even though non-whites are more likely to be unemployed, earn lower wages, and have greater personal economic concerns, their trade preferences have more to do with the broader social context than with whether they stand to gain or lose economically. The younger profile of non-whites further contributes to their pro-trade views. In addition, non-whites tend to be characterized by lower levels of racial prejudice, which promotes more pro-trade views, while whites are more likely to perceive themselves as having been discriminated against in favor of lower status groups. Lower levels of perceived national superiority among non-whites also promotes their more favorable views of trade.

In short, there is no single factor that accounts for greater trade support among minorities than whites. While economic factors generally work against this finding and lead to

the expectation that whites should be more supportive of trade on the whole, demographics and social attitudes encourage more favorable trade preferences among non-whites.

Figure 4 summarizes the key differences between whites and non-whites that contribute to greater trade support among minorities relative to whites. While all of these differences are statistically significant, they vary in importance due to the size of the gap between racial groups and the varying impact of the factor on trade preferences. Importantly, there are also other—primarily economic—factors that work in the opposite direction, encouraging minorities to oppose trade. But the prevailing forces are the demographic and social attitudes of minorities relative to whites.

[Figure 4 here]

Two intriguing over-time trends emerge from our decomposition analyses. One is that composition effects from party identification have steadily increased from 6 percent in 2007, to 12 percent in 2013, to a whopping 38 percent of the gap in 2016. Over time, party identification accounts for an increasing portion of the gap. Because most non-whites tend to be Democrats, and Democrats have become the more pro-trade of the two American political parties, minorities' lower levels of prejudice and greater openness to difference now aligns them with pro-trade views in both their social attitudes and their party identification. This is precisely the opposite of what one might have expected in the past. Since World War II, Republicans have been at the vanguard of trade liberalization and policies promoting unfettered markets, while opposing many social welfare programs. Now the same underlying racial views that contributed to social welfare opposition among whites also contributes to trade support among non-whites.

A second trend is that the size of the racial gap in trade preferences has steadily increased from 2007 to 2013 to 2016. When we take the size of the gap between whites and non-whites, and standardize it by the standard error of the difference score, there is a gradual increase over

time, from 3.51 in 2007 to 4.69 in 2013, to 5.98 in 2016. In effect, trade has become another “racialized” issue. Just as social welfare policies are known to be linked to Americans’ racial attitudes, now trade attitudes are similarly linked as well. Given the many existing divides on social attitudes between racial groups, this is unfortunate. What various observers have cast as primarily an economic issue, with economic roots that might draw working class whites and non-whites closer together, is no such thing.

Thus far, due to the more limited sample sizes among specific minority groups, we have combined all non-whites in a single group and compared them to whites. But variation is also likely to exist between various minority groups when it comes to trade. In order to examine these potential differences, we drew on an extremely large representative survey with just over 18,000 respondents. Although it includes only one trade question, its size facilitates a comparison of whites with African-Americans, Hispanics, and those of other or mixed racial backgrounds.

Figure 5 shows the mean levels of support for trade broken down by these four racial categories. Hispanics ($n = 1,074$) demonstrate the highest level of trade support, followed by the mixed race/other category ($n = 793$), then Blacks ($n = 1,519$), with whites displaying the lowest level of trade support ($n = 14,901$). Planned contrasts between the means within each group relative to the mean for whites suggests that Hispanics and Others are both significantly lower in trade support, whereas African-Americans are only marginally different ($p = .10$). Given that this survey did not include potential explanations for the growing gap between whites and non-whites on this issue, we can only speculate as to the sources of variation among racial minorities. To the extent that Hispanics are often recent immigrants to the U.S., with roots in other countries, the greater support for trade may reflect an interest in the well-being of both the U.S. and some of its major trade partners such as Mexico. African-Americans, who have lived in the U.S. far longer, may have fewer important foreign connections.

In light of the U.S. Hispanic population's growth since this survey was conducted in 2007, the overall decline in American support for trade is even more surprising. However, given that the Hispanic and mixed race population is expected to grow still further in years to come, this trend bodes well for trade advocates. Likewise, if the more positive predispositions of the younger generation toward trade persist until adulthood, they too should increase support for international trade.

[Figure 5 here]

Conclusions

In this paper, we have conducted one of the first analyses of differences in trade attitudes among ethnic and racial groups in the United States. Our findings reveal that minorities are considerably more pro-trade than whites, especially in the last decade. This racial gap stems from the tendency for non-whites to be younger, less nationalistic, less prejudiced, and less likely to reside in areas with a heavy manufacturing base than whites.

These results have several noteworthy implications. First, they reinforce the findings of previous research that non-material factors heavily influence trade attitudes and even outweigh basic economic considerations. The economic attributes of non-whites—most notably, the fact that they tend to be lower skilled, earn less, experience greater unemployment, and have less economic education than whites—provide ample reason to expect them to be especially hostile to trade. That they are particularly pro-trade stems from their relative youth, their weaker sense of national superiority, and lower levels of racial prejudice. Their attitudes on trade also stem from the tendency for minorities to live in areas that are not dependent on manufacturing, a sector of the U.S. economy that has been hard-hit by trade. As a whole, these results indicate

that, for the mass public, trade is more of a psychological and social issue than it is a personal economic issue.

Because opposition to globalization has increased in the U.S. in recent years, concerns have been raised that this trend could lead government officials to raise trade barriers and scuttle trade agreements. These are important concerns, but our second major implication is that to the extent that mass attitudes about trade influence trade policy, there may be reason for optimism. In less than three decades, the U.S. is expected to become a “minority majority” country. Not only do minorities hold more favorable views of trade than whites, but the magnitude of this racial gap has grown steadily over the past decade. If the gap persists or widens, the rapidly rising non-white population may contribute to increased mass support for globalization.

A third implication is potentially more problematic. In the U.S., negative views of trade stem overwhelmingly from concerns that open foreign commerce contributes to job losses. Many trade advocates have long assumed that if the social safety net in the U.S. were stronger, job displacement would be viewed less negatively than is currently the case, and trade would receive more widespread support. However, the very same groups of people who are now most likely to oppose trade are even more opposed to strengthening the social safety net. This puts policymakers who may wish to alleviate public concerns about the adverse consequences of trade in a bind. If white Americans view trade adjustment assistance as yet another undesirable government handout, it will do little to promote their support for international trade. In a rapidly shifting global economy, the U.S. will be at a severe disadvantage if it cannot help its workforce respond effectively to change.

References

- Allport, Gordon W. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Bohara, Alok K., and William H. Kaempfer. 1991. A Test of Tariff Endogeneity in the United States. *American Economic Review* 81 (4): 952–60.
- Bown, Chad P., and Meredith A. Crowley. 2013. Import Protection, Business Cycles, and Exchange Rates: Evidence from the Great Recession. *Journal of International Economics* 90 (May): 50-64.
- Brewer, Marilynn. 2007. The Importance of Being “We”: Human Nature and Intergroup Relations. *American Psychologist* 62 (8): 728-38.
- Card, David, and Alan B. Krueger. 1992. Social Quality and Black-White Relative Earnings. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 107 (1): 151-200.
- Carter, Niambi M., and Efrén O. Pérez. 2016. Race and Nation: How Racial Hierarchy Shapes National Attachments. *Political Psychology* 37 (4): 497-513.
- Cebotari, Victor. 2015. The Determinants of National Pride of Ethnic and Immigrant Minorities in Europe. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 21 (3): 269-88.
- Craig, Steven C., Richard G. Niemi, and Glenn E. Silver. 1990. Political Efficacy and Trust: A Report on the NES Pilot Study Items. *Political Behavior* 12:289-314.
- Davenport, Lauren. 2017. *Politics Beyond Black and White: Multiracial Identity and Attitudes in America*. Forthcoming.
- Davis, Mark H. 1983. Measuring Individual Differences in Empathy: Evidence for a Multidimensional Approach. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 44 (1) (1983): 113-26.
- Elkins, Zachary, and John Sides. 2007. Can Institutions Build Unity in Multiethnic States? *American Political Science Review* 101 (4): 693-708.
- Farley, Reynolds, Elaine L. Fielding, and Maria Krysan. 1997. The Residential Preferences of Blacks and Whites: A Four-Metropolis Analysis. *Housing Policy Debate* 8 (4): 763-800.
- Fortin, Nicole, Thomas Lemieux, and Sergio Firpo. 2010. Decomposition Methods in Economics. In *The Handbook of Labor Economics*, Vol. 4A, edited by Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, 1-102. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
- Gao, George. 2016. Biggest Share of Whites in U.S. are Boomers, but for Minority Groups It’s Millennials or Younger. Pew Research Center.
- Gilens, Martin. 1986. Gender and Support for Reagan: A Comprehensive Model of Presidential

- Approval. *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (1): 19-49.
- Gidengil, Elisabeth. 1995. Economic Man—Social Woman? The Case of the Gender Gap in Support for the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. *Comparative Political Studies* 28 (3): 384-408.
- Guisinger, Alexandra. 2017. *American Opinion on Trade: Preferences without Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox. 2006. Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes toward International Trade. *International Organization* 60 (2): 469-98.
- Herrmann, Richard K., Philip E. Tetlock, and Matthew N. Diascro. 2001. How Americans Think About Trade: Reconciling Conflicts Among Money, Power, and Principles. *International Studies Quarterly* 45 (2): 191-218.
- Hiscox, Michael J. 2006. Through a Glass and Darkly: Attitudes toward International Trade and the Curious Effects of Issue Framing. *International Organization* 60 (3): 755-80.
- Hoyle, Rick H., Monica J. Harris, and Charles M. Judd. 2001. *Research Methods in Social Relations* (7th ed.). Independence, KY: Cengage Learning.
- Irwin, Douglas A. 2005. The Rise of US Anti-Dumping Activity in Historical Perspective. *The World Economy* 28 (5): 651-68.
- Jackman, Simon, and Lynn Vavreck. 2011. Cosmopolitanism. In *Facing the Challenge of Democracy: Explorations in the Analysis of Public Opinion and Political Participation*, edited by Paul M. Sniderman and Benjamin Highton. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kinder, Donald R., and Cindy Kam. 2009. *Us Against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Leamer, Edward E. 1984. *Sources of International Comparative Advantage: Theory and Evidence*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Liu, Cong. 2004. Multi-Item Measures. In *Encyclopedia of Research Methods for the Social Sciences*, edited by Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Alan Bryman, and Tim Futing Liao, 674. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Maggiotto, Michael A., and Eugene R. Wittkopf. 1981. American public attitudes toward foreign policy. *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (4): 601-31.
- Mannetti, Lucia, Antonio Pierro, Arie Kruglanski, Toon Taris, and Petar Bezinovic. 2002. A Cross-cultural Study of the Need for Cognitive Closure Scale: Comparing its Structure in Croatia, Italy, USA and The Netherlands. *British Journal of Social Psychology* 41 (1): 139-56.

- Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety. *International Organization* 63 (3): 425-57.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. 2013. US versus Them: Mass Attitudes toward Offshore Outsourcing. *World Politics* 65 (4): 571-608.
- Mayda, Anna Maria, and Dani Rodrik. 2005. Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist than Others? *European Economic Review* 49 (6): 1393-430.
- Mutz, Diana C. 2015. Countries Like Mine: Explaining Variation in American Attitudes Toward Trading Partners. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
- Mutz, Diana C., and Eunji Kim. 2017. How Ingroup Favoritism Affects Trade Preferences. *International Organization*. Forthcoming.
- Oaxaca, Ronald. 1973. Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban labor Markets. *International Economic Review* 14 (3): 693-709.
- O'Rourke, Kevin H., and Richard Sinnott. 2001. The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence. *Brookings Trade Forum*. 157-206.
- Pratto, Felicia, Jim Sidanius, Lisa M. Stallworth, and Bertram F. Malle. 1994. Social Dominance Orientation: A Personality Variable Predicting Social and Political Attitudes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 67 (4): 741.
- Rankin, David M. 2001. Identities, Interests, and Imports. *Political Behavior* 23 (4): 351-76.
- Sabet, Shahrzad. 2013. What's in a Name? Isolating the Effect of Prejudice on Individual Trade Preferences. Paper prepared for presentation at the 109th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, 29 August-1 September.
- Scheve, Kenneth F., and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences. *Journal of International Economics* 54 (2): 267-92.
- Sidanius, Jim, Seymour Feshbach, Shana Levin, and Felicia Pratto. 1997. The Interface between Ethnic and National Attachment: Ethnic Pluralism or Ethnic Dominance? *Public Opinion Quarterly* 61 (1): 102-33.
- Spence, Janet T., and Robert L. Helmreich 1983. Achievement-Related Motives and Behavior. In *Achievement and Achievement Motives: Psychological and Sociological Approaches*, edited by Janet T. Spence, 10-74. San Francisco: Freeman.
- Stolper, Wolfgang F., and Paul A. Samuelson. 1941. Protection and Real Wages. *Review of Economic Studies* 9 (1): 58-73.
- Tajfel, Henri. 1982. *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


Zumbrunnen, John, and Amy Gangl. 2008. Conflict, Fusion, or Coexistence? The Complexity of Contemporary American Conservatism. *Political Behavior* 30 (2): 199-221.

Theiss-Morse, Elizabeth. 2009. *Who Counts as an American? The Boundaries of National Identity*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2017. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Available at: <https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat18.htm>


U.S. Census Bureau. 2016. Quick Facts. Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau. Available at: <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045216>

Figure 1. Support for Trade Among Whites and Non-Whites




Note: Trade support items from each survey are re-coded to range from 0 to 1. All differences between groups are statistically significant.

Figure 2. Support for Globalization and Trade Over Time by Whites and Non-Whites



Note: The top panel presents responses to a Chicago Council of Global Affairs survey question about whether globalization is good or bad for the American economy, with percentage good illustrated. The bottom panel presents responses to a question about whether international trade is good or bad for the American economy. The latter question was not asked in the 1998, 2012, or 2014 surveys. Dashed lines in the top figure and the error bars in the bottom figure indicate 95% confidence intervals.


Figure 3. Support for Outsourcing by Whites and Non-Whites




Note: All racial differences are statistically significant based on two-tailed *t*-tests. Variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1.

Figure 4. Racial Differences in Key Explanatory Variables


Panel 1:



Panel 2:




Panel 3:



Note: Each panel above summarizes differences in the key explanatory variables that contribute to greater trade support among minorities relative to Whites from three datasets (Panel 1: 2007 Mansfield-Mutz survey, Panel 2: 2013 ISCAP Survey, Panel 3: 2016 ISCAP Survey).

Figure 5. Support for Trade by Racial Group



Note: Mean levels of trade support were significantly different by race ($F = 13.7, p < .001$), and planned comparisons confirmed that Whites have a lower level of trade support than Others ($F = 8.6, p < .01$) and Hispanics ($F=33.5, p<.001$). The difference between Whites and Blacks was only marginally significant ($F = 2.37, p = .12$).

Table 1. Decomposition of White-Non-White Differences in Trade Support, 2007

	Coefficients			Adjusted means		Difference due to means		Effect	Total
	Pooled	Whites	Non-whites	Whites	Non-whites	Composition	Percent composition		
Isolationism	-0.140***	-0.129***	-0.190***	-0.072	-0.068	-0.001	-1.768%	0.004	0.004
Pro-Competition	0.025*	0.033**	-0.001	-0.088	-0.045	0.001	1.916%	0.002	0.003
Racial Prejudice	-0.101***	-0.119***	-0.013	0.067	0.037	0.002	5.585%	0.006	0.007
Market Conservatism	0.064***	0.055***	0.087**	0.297	0.256	-0.003	-8.400%	0.009	0.006
Economic Knowledge	0.045***	0.046***	0.052*	0.252	0.251	0.000	-0.165%	0.001	0.001
Average Occupational Wage	0.021	-0.003	0.105*	-0.676	-0.673	0.000	0.499%	-0.073	-0.073
Percentage Manufacturing Employment	-0.054**	-0.059**	-0.041	-0.432	-0.511	0.004	11.284%	-0.008	-0.004
National Superiority	-0.048***	-0.053***	-0.031	0.373	0.296	0.003	9.208%	0.007	0.010
Unemployed	-0.028**	-0.047**	0.019	-0.927	-0.859	-0.001	-2.714%	-0.059	-0.060
Party ID (D)	0.013	0.013	0.003	-0.010	0.268	0.002	5.987%	-0.001	0.001
Gender (F)	-0.006	-0.002	-0.025*	-0.093	-0.010	-0.001	-3.202%	0.001	0.000
Education	0.030***	0.032***	0.013	0.193	0.230	0.001	2.343%	-0.004	-0.003
Age	-0.040***	-0.028*	-0.080**	-0.193	-0.286	0.005	14.241%	0.012	0.017
Metropolitan Area	0.019**	0.018**	0.033	0.593	0.857	0.007	19.292%	0.010	0.017

Note: In addition to the variables listed above, the original equation also included whether the respondent had ever taken an economics course, willingness to relocate for a new job, whether the respondent was employed in an import-dominant, export-dominant or trade-neutral industry, union membership and household income. None of these variables significantly predicted Trade Support in either the pooled or subgroup samples, so they were dropped from further analysis. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 2. Decomposition of White-Non-White Differences in Trade Support, 2013

	Coefficients			Adjusted means		Differences due to means		Effect	Total
	Pooled	Whites	Non-whites	Whites	Non-whites	Composition	Percent composition		
Isolationism	-0.147***	-0.151***	-0.134***	0.129	0.065	0.009	17.356%	-0.001	0.181
Social Dominance Orientation	-0.071***	-0.067***	-0.075**	-0.262	-0.352	0.006	12.233%	0.001	0.129
Empathy	-0.042**	-0.049**	-0.003	0.366	0.358	0.000	0.380%	0.002	0.006
Cosmopolitanism	0.041***	0.032**	0.065***	-0.368	-0.344	0.001	2.204%	0.009	0.032
Party ID (D)	0.021**	0.013	0.017	-0.057	0.365	0.006	12.063%	0.001	0.128
Gender (F)	-0.018***	-0.017**	-0.020*	-0.058	0.011	-0.001	-2.456%	0.002	-0.023
Education	0.042***	0.057***	0.006	0.278	0.111	-0.005	-10.002%	0.024	-0.081
Economic Knowledge	0.011*	0.011	0.019	-0.068	-0.188	-0.002	-3.423%	0.003	-0.033
Perceived Success of Social Welfare System	0.041***	0.025*	0.093***	-0.229	-0.166	0.004	6.981%	-0.060	0.013

Note: In addition to the variables listed above, the original equation also included perceived national superiority, whether the respondent was unemployed or not, age, metropolitan area of residence, and an index of risk avoidance. None of these variables significantly predicted Trade Support in either the pooled or subgroup samples, so they were dropped from further analysis. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 3. Decomposition of White-Non-White Differences in Trade Support, 2016

	Coefficients			Adjusted means		Differences due to means		Effect	Total
	Pooled	Whites	Non-whites	Whites	Non-whites	Composition	Percent composition		
Isolationism	-0.087***	-0.087***	-0.089***	0.015	-0.020	0.003	4.989%	0.000	0.053
National Superiority	-0.004	-0.027*	0.039*	0.272	0.295	0.000	0.218%	0.019	0.021
Market Conservatism	0.055***	0.049***	0.063**	0.191	0.207	0.001	1.439%	0.003	0.018
Personal economic insecurity	-0.044***	-0.048***	-0.045**	0.284	0.317	-0.002	-2.523%	0.001	-0.026
Social Dominance Orientation	-0.023	-0.029	-0.012	-0.348	-0.390	0.001	1.408%	-0.006	0.009
Party ID (D)	-0.061***	-0.054***	-0.059***	0.025	-0.376	0.023	36.827%	0.001	0.392
Gender (F)	-0.005	0.001	-0.018*	0.090	0.159	-0.001	-0.925%	-0.002	-0.012
Education	0.008	0.017	-0.008	0.394	0.255	-0.001	-0.998%	-0.008	-0.019
Age	-0.069***	-0.069***	-0.056***	-0.005	-0.279	0.017	27.833%	-0.002	0.294
Median Income (in zip code area)	0.033	0.027	0.060	-0.506	-0.564	-0.003	-4.109%	-0.018	-0.061
Percentage Manufacturing Employment (in zip code area)	-0.060***	-0.042*	-0.101**	-0.496	-0.582	0.006	9.976%	0.032	0.138
Legitimacy of Political System	0.113***	0.107***	0.124***	-0.090	-0.038	0.006	9.747%	-0.001	0.102
Perceived Discrimination Against High Status Groups	-0.148***	-0.129***	-0.175***	-0.192	-0.309	0.018	29.130%	0.011	0.321

Note: In addition to the variables listed above, the original equation also included prejudice, residing in a metropolitan area, social trust, unemployed or not, percent unemployment in zip code, and risk aversion. None of these variables significantly predicted Trade Support in either the pooled or subgroup samples, so they were dropped from further analysis. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire

Trade Support

Mansfield and Mutz (2007)

1. Do you think government should try to encourage international trade or try to discourage international trade?
2. Do you believe that globalization, especially the increasing connections of our economy with others around the world, is good or bad for the United States?
3. Should foreign companies be encouraged or discouraged from investing in the United States, for example, by building one of their factories in this country?
4. Do you favor or oppose the federal government in Washington negotiating more free trade agreements like NAFTA?
5. Do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the WTO, the World Trade Organization?

Cronbach's Alpha: 0.83

ISCAP 2013 Survey

1. Do you think government should try to encourage international trade or try to discourage international trade?
2. Do you believe that globalization, especially the increasing connections of our economy with others around the world, is good or bad for the United States?
3. Should foreign companies be encouraged or discouraged from investing in the United States, for example, by building one of their factories in this country?
4. Do you favor or oppose the federal government in Washington negotiating more free trade agreements like NAFTA?
5. Do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the WTO, the World Trade Organizations?

Cronbach's Alpha: 0.83

ISCAP 2016 Survey (Amerispeak/NORC)

1. Do you favor or oppose the federal government in Washington negotiating more free trade agreements?
2. Thinking about the increasing amount of trade between the U.S. and other countries, do you think this has helped the United States economy, hurt the United States economy, or has it not affected the U.S. economy?

Cronbach's Alpha: 0.64

NAES 2008 Wave 1

1. Do you favor or oppose the federal government in Washington negotiating more free trade agreements like NAFTA?

Chicago Council 14

1. N9A. As you may know, the United States is now negotiating a free trade agreement with twelve Pacific nations called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (or TPP). Based on what you know, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose this free trade agreement?
2. N9B. As you may know, the United States is now negotiating a free trade agreement with the European Union called the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (or TTIP). Based on what you know, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose this free trade agreement?

Chicago Council 16

1. As you may know, the United States is now negotiating a free trade agreement with twelve Pacific nations called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (or TPP). Based on what you know, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose this free trade agreement?

Outsourcing Support

Mansfield and Mutz (2007)

1. Recently, some American companies have been hiring workers in other countries to replace workers in the U.S. who are paid higher wages. An example of this is people who take customer service telephone calls. Do you think the government should encourage or discourage this or stay out of this matter?
2. Some say that outsourcing jobs is bad and should be discouraged by the government. Others say that outsourcing saves companies money and allows them to sell goods more cheaply, so the government should encourage it. [Respondents were then asked whether the government should encourage outsourcing, discourage outsourcing, or stay out of the matter.]
3. Overall, do you think outsourcing has generally been good for the American economy, bad for the economy, or has it not affected the American economy either way?

Cronbach's Alpha: 0.74

Isolationism

Mansfield and Mutz (2007) | ISCAP 2013 Survey | ISCAP 2016 Survey

“Next we have some questions about what role the U.S. should play with respect to the rest of the world. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.”

1. The U.S. needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world.
2. The U.S. government should just try to take care of the well-being of Americans and not get involved with other nations.
3. It is essential for the United States to work with other nations to solve problems, such as overpopulation, hunger, and pollution.
4. It will be best for the future of the country if we stay out of world affairs.
5. The United States has a responsibility to play the role of “world policeman,” that is, to fight violations of international law and aggression wherever they occur.

Cronbach's Alpha: 0.74 (Mansfield and Mutz 2007); 0.79 (ISCAP 2013); 0.73 (ISCAP 2016)

National Superiority

Mansfield and Mutz (2007) | ISCAP 2013 Survey | ISCAP 2016 Survey

“To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of these statements?”

1. In the United States, our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others.
2. I would rather be a citizen of America than of any other country in the world.
3. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Americans.

Cronbach's Alpha: 0.76 (Mansfield and Mutz 2007); 0.73 (ISCAP 2013); 0.74 (ISCAP 2016)

Racial Prejudice

Mansfield and Mutz (2007)

“Where would you rate [BLACKS/WHITES/HISPANIC-AMERICANS] in general on these scales?” (7-point scale)

1. Hard working (1) – Lazy (7)
2. Efficient (1) – Wasteful (7)
3. Trustworthy (1) – Untrustworthy (7)

ISCAP 2016 Survey

1. Next we have some questions about different groups in our society. We're going to show you a seven-point scale on which the char – Blacks
2. Next we have some questions about different groups in our society. We're going to show you a seven-point scale on which the char – Whites
3. Next we have some questions about different groups in our society. We're going to show you a seven-point scale on which the char – Hispanics

Social Dominance Orientation

ISCAP 2013 Survey | ISCAP 2016 Survey

“There are many kinds of groups in the world: men and women, ethnic and religious groups, nationalities, political factions. How much do you support or oppose these ideas about groups in general? For each statement select a number from 1 to 10 to show your opinion.” 1. Extremely oppose – 10. Extremely favor.

1. In setting priorities, we must consider all groups.
2. We should not push for group equality.
3. Group equality should be our ideal.
4. Superior groups should dominate inferior groups.

Cronbach's Alpha: 0.70 (ISCAP 2013); 0.53 (ISCAP 2016)

Personal Attitudes toward Competition

Mansfield and Mutz (2007)

“Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.”

1. I feel that winning is important in both work and games.
2. I perform better when I am not competing against someone.
3. Because it is important that a winner is decided, I do not like to leave a game unfinished.
4. I like to win because that means that I did better than other people.
5. People who expect to get ahead in their careers or jobs should be willing to relocate their families.

Cronbach's Alpha: 0.63

Market Conservatism

Mansfield and Mutz (2007) | ISCAP 2016 Survey

“We hear a lot of talk these days about the idea of the 'marketplace,' where goods and services are bought and sold and businesses compete for customers. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of these statements about the marketplace?”

1. The marketplace is generally more efficient and less wasteful than government.
2. The marketplace is democratic because it allows everyone to express their preferences by choosing what to buy.
3. Institutions like government and public schools should follow the principles of the marketplace.

Cronbach's Alpha: 0.72 (Mansfield and Mutz 2007); 0.72 (ISCAP 2016)

Economics Knowledge

Mansfield and Mutz (2007)

1. Have you ever taken any courses on economics? (1. Yes 2. No)
2. Do most economists believe that free trade is good for the economy or bad for the economy? (1. Good for the economy, 2. Bad for the economy, 3. Economists are split evenly on this, 4. Not sure/Don't know.)

ISCAP 2013 Survey

“Please just answer these next questions as best as you can. You should feel free to guess even if you're not at all sure.” (1. Increase, 2. Stay the same, 3. Decrease)

1. If the U.S. dollar increases in value, then U.S. exports to other countries are likely to....
2. If the U.S. dollar increases in value, then U.S. imports of goods from other countries are likely to....

Unemployment

ISCAP 2016 Survey

Current Employment Status. 1. Working - as a paid employee, 2. Working - self-employed, 3. Not working - on temporary layoff from a job, 4. Not working - looking for work, 5. Not working – retired, 6. Not working – disabled, 7. Not working – other.

Mansfield and Mutz (2007)

Which statement best describes your current employment status? 1. I work as a paid employee, 2. I am self-employed, 3. I am an owner or partner in a small business, professional practice, or farm, 4. I work at least 15 hours a week without pay in a family business or farm, 5. I am unemployed, temporarily laid off, but looking for work, 6. I am retired, 7. I am disabled, 8. I am a homemaker, 9. Other.

Willingness To Relocate

Mansfield and Mutz (2007)

“If you lost your job and had a hard time finding as good a job near where you live, how likely would you be to move to another part of the country if there were a good job there?” (1. Very likely, 2. Somewhat likely, 3. Somewhat unlikely, 4. Very unlikely.)

Personal Economic Insecurity

ISCAP 2016 Survey

“Next is a list of things that some people worry about and others do not. Please indicate how worried you are about each of the following statements.” (1. Very worried, 2. Somewhat worried, 3. Not too worried, 4. Not at all worried.)

1. That you won't be able to afford the health care services you and your family need?
2. About not having enough money for retirement?
3. About not being able to afford the cost of education for yourself or a family member?

Cronbach's Alpha: 0.75

Trait Empathy

ISCAP 2013 Survey

“Please tell us how well each of the following statements describes you.” (5-point scale) 1. Does not describe me at all – 3. Describes me somewhat – 5. Describes me very well.

1. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.
2. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.
3. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.
4. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.

5. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them.
6. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.
7. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.

Cronbach's Alpha: 0.80

Cosmopolitanism

ISCAP 2013 Survey

"We are interested in the kinds of things people do for recreation. Tell us a little bit about yourself. In the last 10 years have you..." 1. Yes, 2. No

1. Been to Europe or Australia?
2. Traveled to Canada or Mexico?
3. Visited Asia, Africa or South America?
4. Gone to an Indian restaurant?
5. Had Japanese food?

Cronbach's Alpha: 0.70

Social Trust

ISCAP 2016 Survey

1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? 1. Most are trustworthy, 2. Can't be too careful.
2. Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? 1. Would take advantage, 2. Try to be fair.
3. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves? 1. Try to be helpful, 2. Look out for themselves.

Cronbach's Alpha: 0.73

Need for Certainty

ISCAP 2016 Survey

"On a 1 to 6 scale (where 1 means it is not at all true of you, and 6 means it is very true of you), please indicate how true each of the following statements is for you"

1. I dislike questions that could be answered in many different ways.
2. I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament.
3. I would quickly become impatient and irritated if I could not find a solution to a problem immediately.
4. I dislike unpredictable situations.

Cronbach's Alpha: 0.63

ISCAP 2013 Survey

1. In general, people often have to take risks when making financial, career, or other life decisions. Overall, how would you place yourself on the following scale? (1. Extremely comfortable taking risks - 3. Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable taking risks - 5. Extremely uncomfortable taking risks.)
2. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statement (1. Totally disagree - 3. Neither disagree nor agree - 5. Totally agree)
 1. Safety first
 2. I do not take risks with my health
 3. I prefer to avoid risks
 4. I take risks regularly

5. I really dislike not knowing what is going to happen
6. I usually view risks as a challenge

Cronbach's Alpha: 0.71

Perceived Discrimination against Dominant Groups

ISCAP 2016 Survey

1. A great deal, 2. A lot, 3. A moderate amount, 4. A little, 5. None at all
 1. "How much discrimination is there in the United States today against each of the following groups? – Blacks"
 2. "How much discrimination is there in the United States today against each of the following groups? – Hispanics"
 3. "How much discrimination is there in the United States today against each of the following groups? – Whites"
 4. "How much discrimination is there in the United States today against each of the following groups? – Women"
 5. "How much discrimination is there in the United States today against each of the following groups? – Men"
 6. "How much discrimination is there in the United States today against each of the following groups? – Muslims"
 7. "How much discrimination is there in the United States today against each of the following groups? – Christians"

Perceived Social Welfare Success

ISCAP 2013 Survey

"How successful do you think the government in the US is nowadays in each of these areas?" Very successful, Somewhat successful, Somewhat unsuccessful, Very unsuccessful

1. Providing health care for the sick if they cannot pay for it themselves.
2. Providing decent housing for those who cannot afford it.
3. Providing those who are poor with adequate food and nutrition.
4. Providing a decent standard of living for people who lose their jobs.

Cronbach's Alpha: 0.87

Legitimacy of the Political System

ISCAP 2016 Survey

"Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements." 1. Strongly agree, 2. Somewhat agree, 3. Neither agree nor disagree, 4. Somewhat disagree, 5. Strongly disagree

1. I would rather live under our system of government than any other that I can think of.
2. Our system of government is in need of some serious changes.
3. Whatever its faults may be, our form of government is best for representing the interests of the country's citizens.
4. At present I feel very critical of our political system.

Cronbach's Alpha: 0.60

Union Membership

Mansfield and Mutz (2007)

Are you a member of a labor union? 1. Yes, 2. No

Appendix B: External Data Source Information

Data Source Information

Below are the source information for wage and import/export.

Occupational Wage:

Average of occupational annual average wage weighted by estimated number of employees.

Source: Questions

Occupational Employment Statistics, May 2006 Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates

URL: <https://www.bls.gov/oes/special.requests/oesm06nat.zip>

Import/Export Orientation:

We first calculated log of import/gross output and export/gross output using the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry code. A 3-level categorical variable was created to indicate whether import > export or export > import or trade neutral.

Source:

USITC Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb Version 3.1.0

URL: http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/user_set.asp

Industry Economic Accounts by Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce

URL: http://bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm

% Manufacturing Jobs in Zip Code Area / % Unemployment Rate in Zip Code Area

Source: U.S. Census

Appendix C: Full Regression Results Before Decomposition Analysis

Table B1. Full regression results using 2007 Mansfield-Mutz dataset

	<i>DV = Trade Support</i>		
	Full Sample	White	Non-White
Isolationism	-0.135 ^{***} (0.012)	-0.127 ^{***} (0.012)	-0.174 ^{***} (0.032)
Pro-Competition	0.020 [*] (0.010)	0.030 ^{**} (0.011)	-0.017 (0.026)
Racial Prejudice	-0.104 ^{***} (0.029)	-0.123 ^{***} (0.033)	-0.029 (0.068)
Market Conservatism	0.062 ^{***} (0.012)	0.054 ^{***} (0.014)	0.080 ^{**} (0.028)
Economics Course	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.014)
Economic Knowledge	0.044 ^{***} (0.009)	0.043 ^{***} (0.010)	0.057 [*] (0.024)
Willingness to Relocate	0.005 (0.007)	0.002 (0.008)	0.020 (0.016)
% Unemployment (zip code area)	-0.041 (0.039)	-0.038 (0.047)	-0.077 (0.084)
Average Occupational Wage	0.018 (0.023)	-0.002 (0.026)	0.091 (0.050)
% Manufacturing (zip code area)	-0.052 ^{**} (0.017)	-0.057 ^{**} (0.018)	-0.020 (0.052)
National Superiority	-0.048 ^{***} (0.012)	-0.050 ^{***} (0.014)	-0.039 (0.027)
Export-oriented Job	-0.002 (0.012)	0.000 (0.013)	-0.015 (0.034)
Union membership	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.018)
Unemployed	-0.025 (0.012)	-0.045 ^{**} (0.014)	0.026 (0.026)
Party ID (D)	0.014 (0.007)	0.013 (0.008)	0.006 (0.019)
Gender (F)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.028 [*] (0.012)
Income	0.007 (0.010)	0.007 (0.012)	0.008 (0.025)
Education	0.024 ^{**} (0.009)	0.027 ^{**} (0.010)	0.005 (0.022)
Age	-0.033 ^{**} (0.011)	-0.022 (0.012)	-0.076 [*] (0.031)
Metropolitan area	0.019 ^{**} (0.007)	0.017 [*] (0.007)	0.050 (0.026)
Constant	0.459 ^{***} (0.038)	0.434 ^{***} (0.045)	0.506 ^{***} (0.081)
<i>N</i>	1695	1389	306

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B2. Full regression results using 2013 ISCAP survey

	DV = <i>Trade Support</i>		
	Full Sample	White	Non-White
Isolationism	-0.147 ^{***} (0.011)	-0.150 ^{***} (0.012)	-0.136 ^{***} (0.025)
National Superiority	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.034 (0.023)
Social Dominance Orientation	-0.068 ^{**} (0.014)	-0.066 ^{***} (0.016)	-0.073 [*] (0.030)
Empathy	-0.042 ^{**} (0.016)	-0.052 ^{**} (0.018)	0.000 (0.034)
Cosmopolitanism	0.036 ^{***} (0.009)	0.028 ^{**} (0.010)	0.056 ^{**} (0.019)
Unemployed	0.009 (0.009)	0.006 (0.011)	0.009 (0.016)
Party ID (D)	0.018 [*] (0.007)	0.012 (0.008)	0.012 (0.017)
Gender (F)	-0.018 ^{***} (0.005)	-0.017 ^{**} (0.005)	-0.019 (0.010)
Income	0.005 (0.011)	0.006 (0.012)	0.009 (0.024)
Education	0.039 ^{**} (0.008)	0.056 ^{***} (0.010)	-0.001 (0.016)
Age	-0.001 (0.009)	0.006 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.020)
Economic Knowledge	0.012 [*] (0.006)	0.011 (0.006)	0.021 (0.013)
Perceived Welfare Success	0.041 ^{***} (0.009)	0.026 [*] (0.010)	0.097 ^{***} (0.021)
Risk Avoidance	0.001 (0.013)	0.008 (0.015)	-0.024 (0.029)
Metropolitan area	0.009 (0.006)	0.006 (0.007)	0.004 (0.019)
Constant	0.582 ^{***} (0.012)	0.563 ^{***} (0.015)	0.631 ^{***} (0.029)
N	1673	1313	360

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B3. Full regression results using 2016 ISCAP survey

	DV = <i>Trade Support</i>		
	Full Sample	White	Non-White
Isolationism	-0.091*** (0.012)	-0.087*** (0.014)	-0.110*** (0.023)
National Superiority	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.028 (0.014)	0.046* (0.021)
Racial Prejudice	-0.016 (0.023)	0.007 (0.031)	-0.025 (0.037)
Market Conservatism	0.056*** (0.011)	0.050*** (0.013)	0.065** (0.020)
Economic Insecurity	-0.042*** (0.009)	-0.048 (0.011)	-0.037* (0.016)
Metropolitan Area	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.008)	0.015 (0.020)
Social Dominance Orientation	-0.018 (0.014)	-0.030 (0.017)	0.001 (0.024)
Social Trust	0.008 (0.010)	0.002 (0.012)	0.021 (0.017)
Unemployed	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)
Party ID (D)	-0.061*** (0.008)	-0.053*** (0.010)	-0.047** (0.017)
Female	-0.006 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.023** (0.009)
Income	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.013)	0.024 (0.020)
Education	0.008 (0.008)	0.019 (0.010)	-0.017 (0.015)
Age	-0.068*** (0.009)	-0.072*** (0.011)	-0.037* (0.017)
Median Income (in zip code area)	0.031 (0.023)	0.044* (0.026)	-0.005 (0.049)
% Manufacturing Employment (in zip code area)	-0.054** (0.018)	-0.045 (0.020)	-0.064 (0.035)
% Unemployment (in zip code area)	0.019 (0.023)	0.020 (0.031)	-0.036 (0.037)
Need for Certainty	0.002 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.014)	0.014 (0.019)
Legitimacy of the Political System	0.106*** (0.014)	0.107*** (0.017)	0.111*** (0.029)
Perceived Discrimination Against High Status Groups	-0.150*** (0.018)	-0.130*** (0.022)	-0.196*** (0.033)
Constant	0.369*** (0.026)	0.376 (0.031)	0.341*** (0.051)
N	2934	2163	771

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$