Foreign Voices, Familiar Faces: How (Pro)-Russian Disinformation Undermines Trust in Moldova’s Democracy
By Elena Simanschi
Introduction
Across Eastern Europe, EU candidate states are grappling with more than just the typical post-Soviet growing pains. As they strive to implement democratic reforms and align more closely with Western institutions, they also contend with an increasingly sophisticated threat: strategic disinformation. No longer confined to overt propaganda, Russian influence campaigns have evolved into highly localized, emotionally resonant narratives. Their central objective remains clear — to erode public trust in democratically elected governments.
Moldova offers a particularly revealing case study. With fragile institutions, deep linguistic and ethnic divides, and ongoing geopolitical uncertainty, the country is not merely susceptible to foreign narratives — it is a battleground for them. Since President Maia Sandu’s pro-European government came to power in 2020, disinformation efforts have intensified, targeting the foundational trust that binds citizens to the state. (Pro)-Russian disinformation in Moldova doesn’t just mislead; it systematically undermines vertical trust — the confidence citizens place in their elected institutions. What makes this campaign especially insidious is its disguise: these messages often appear through local media, speaking the language, referencing familiar culture, and mimicking the tone of trusted sources. These are not foreign agents shouting from the outside. They are foreign voices wearing familiar faces.
From Soviet Broadcasts to Telegram Channels
Russian disinformation strategies have deep historical roots. During the Soviet era, state media functioned as a tool of state power. After 1991, Russia adapted its messaging to global platforms, heavily investing in international broadcasters like RT and Sputnik. But in neighboring countries like Moldova, a different approach emerged — one that blends domestic legitimacy with foreign messaging. The result is a media landscape filled with content that looks and sounds local but pushes Kremlin-aligned narratives. TV channels such as NTV Moldova and Primul Moldova, along with Russian-language newspapers and Telegram networks, appear domestically grounded while subtly reshaping public opinion in favor of Russian strategic interests. These efforts are finely tuned to Moldova’s vulnerabilities, exploiting cultural divisions, economic insecurity, and identity-based grievances.
The Russian-Speaking Minority: A Strategic Target
One particularly concerning trend is the deliberate targeting of Moldova’s Russian-speaking minority. This group includes individuals who either primarily speak Russian or maintain strong cultural ties to Russian media traditions. For them, Russian-language content is more accessible, more relatable — and often, more trusted. This makes them a strategically important audience. In Moldova, more than 80% of the population understands Russian, and disinformation narratives frequently travel through familiar channels and dialects. These communities become both targets and amplifiers of disinformation — more likely to consume, believe, and circulate pro-Russian messaging.
The narratives are subtle but potent. They tap into nostalgia for the Soviet past, skepticism toward rapid Westernization, and fears of cultural marginalization. Russian-speaking Moldovans are cast not as outsiders but as victims — marginalized by an elite, Western-aligned government. Every reform is framed as a cultural attack, every step toward democracy as a loss of sovereignty, and every alignment with the West as a betrayal.
The Ban That Backfired
In 2023, the Moldovan government, recognizing the scale of the threat, took action. It banned 31 websites identified as disseminating (pro)-Russian disinformation and launched a Center for Strategic Communication and Combating Disinformation. These measures were necessary, but they also highlighted a central dilemma facing emerging democracies in the digital age. On one hand, the government aimed to safeguard public discourse and national security. On the other, it risked reinforcing the narrative pushed by disinformation actors — that the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) was authoritarian, intolerant of dissent, and willing to suppress free speech.
Indeed, the backlash was swift. Within days, disinformation networks had migrated to platforms like Telegram, Facebook, and YouTube — digital spaces with looser content moderation and greater potential for virality. Worse still, the bans were weaponized. In predominantly Russian-speaking regions such as Gagauzia, the government’s actions were portrayed as attempts to silence opposition, not protect democracy. This reveals a painful paradox: in seeking to defend democratic trust, the government may unintentionally feed the very narratives that seek to destroy it.
Trust on the Edge
In emerging democracies, trust is inherently fragile. Citizens in post-communist states often have complex, ambivalent relationships with their institutions. Democratic transitions bring about social and economic reforms that are frequently painful, inconsistent, and slow to produce visible results. In such environments, the bond between citizen and government is constantly being tested. Disinformation thrives on this fragility. It doesn’t just spread falsehoods; it amplifies grievances, weaponizes identity, and pollutes the public sphere. In Moldova, the impact is measurable: public confidence in President Sandu dropped significantly in her first year in office, while disapproval of the government surged from 2021 to 2024.
These shifts are not solely a reflection of policy outcomes. Disinformation has created a distorted lens through which many Moldovans perceive their government — one shaped by conspiracy, cynicism, and cultural manipulation. Crucially, the consequences go beyond perception. This erosion of trust hinders the government’s ability to implement reforms, fuels public unrest, and strengthens anti-democratic forces. In undermining vertical trust, disinformation weakens the entire democratic project.
Moldova as a Mirror
Moldova is far from an isolated case. From Georgia to the Western Balkans, Ukraine to Central Asia, many emerging democracies face similar challenges: pressure from Russia, fragmented societies, and institutions still building legitimacy. In such contexts, disinformation thrives not because of ideological resonance, but because of uncertainty and distrust. Moldova is a particularly instructive example due to the clarity of the patterns and the scale of the effort. But the broader lesson applies universally: where trust is fragile, narratives gain disproportionate power. Where institutions are young, perception often overrides reality. And in nascent democracies, information is not just a tool of governance — it is a cornerstone of stability.
Combating disinformation requires more than technical solutions. While banning harmful content, labeling misinformation, and establishing watchdog institutions are essential, they are not sufficient. Democracies must also learn to communicate more effectively, tell their own stories with confidence, and connect reforms to the lived experiences of their citizens.
Above all, they must build trust not through control, but through credibility. Because disinformation doesn’t succeed by being convincing — it succeeds when people stop believing that truth matters at all.
Conclusion: The Battle for Belief
What is unfolding in Moldova is more than an information crisis. It is a crisis of trust — one that is spreading across the democratic frontier. As countries move closer to the EU and work to distance themselves from old spheres of influence, they must defend not just their physical borders, but their civic imagination.
Disinformation campaigns disguised as local voices do more than spread lies. They hollow out the relationship between citizens and the state. They turn politics into performance and facts into opinion. In doing so, they don’t just weaken governments — they weaken the very principle of democratic accountability.
Moldova’s experience reveals what is at stake. Trust, once lost, is difficult to regain. But it remains the most powerful currency a democracy can hold. In an age where information is everywhere, preserving that trust may be the greatest challenge — and the greatest responsibility — of all.
Simanschi, E. (2025). (Pro)-Russian (dis)information in Moldova: eroding vertical trust in Sandu and the PAS government? Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2025.2500389