The Importance of Russian Information Operations: A Case Study of the Baltics

Russian information operations are challenging the nature of public diplomacy in the 21st century. At first glance, some of the methods used by Russia are not so different from Western counterparts—for example, Russia also uses engagement on social media, international news and broadcasting arms, and international NGOs and think tanks. Russian information operations differ, however, for two primary reasons: their nefarious intentions of undermining world order and sowing chaos rather than spreading liberal democratic values, as well as the fact that information operations are coupled with harder power measures like money laundering and military shows of might. Responding to the threat of Russian information and influence operations requires Western governments to adapt their own methods of public diplomacy.

As a student of Russian, the Milton Wolf Seminar was a very engaging and rewarding experience. Many panels and after-panel discussions centered directly or indirectly on issues of Russian information operations and how to combat them. The discussions involving computational propaganda and digital diplomacy were particularly enlightening.

Many participants at the end, however, expressed a Russian fatigue. To an extent, I also feel this fatigue—but my fatigue is primarily from the way the issue of Russian information operations tends to be approached in dominant discourses. Discussions of Russian information operations all too often are American-centric, focusing on how RT lost the election for the democrats by making fun of Hillary Clinton’s pantsuits or through angry trolling on Facebook and Twitter. It is a disservice to both our understanding of Russian information operations, as well as how they connect to public diplomacy, by limiting the scope of discussion in such a way.

In the following sections, I will present two primary arguments for why I view the issue of Russia as an important topic for public diplomacy that needs to continue to be discussed. Following that I present an overview of Russian information and influence operations in two Baltic countries, Estonia and Latvia, in order to illuminate another case that will broaden our understanding of Russian information operations. I conclude by presenting methods of how public diplomacy can be used in order to challenge Russian information operations.

Why Russia Is Important for Public Diplomacy

I see two primary reasons why continuing the discussion of Russian information operations is important for public diplomacy: first, because the scope of methods Russia is using is unprecedented, making it a diplomatic concern on a Euro-Atlantic, if not global, scale. Second, the methods of Russian information operations sit at the heart of major philosophical debates on the evolution of public diplomacy.

First, the scope and scale of Russian disinformation is quite unprecedented. Propaganda, obviously, is nothing new. States have been publishing and distributing false and misleading stories abroad for centuries in order to serve various self-interested or nefarious purposes. Some of Russia’s contemporary methods may not be all that different from what other states are using, with RT, Russia’s main foreign broadcasting arm, often being compared to China’s CCTV or Qatar’s Al-Jazeera. While most states use multi-pronged efforts to win friends and influence foreign audiences abroad, Russia’s influence efforts are unique for combining news with social media campaigns, campaigns and publications by non-profits and think tanks, digital trolling, cyber attacks, political system and business market penetration, hard military power, espionage, and violence or assassinations. These methods are used to support the lofty goal of creating chaos and undermining the liberal democratic world order. These efforts are widespread and affecting almost every Euro-Atlantic country at an extent that dwarfs the efforts of other nations. This is an obvious diplomatic and security concern, and the issue of how to counter Russian information operations with public diplomacy leads my second reason.

Second, the issue of Russian disinformation deserves discussion for the fact that it sits at the heart of many current questions and debates in public diplomacy. Since its inception, the field of public diplomacy has had to defend itself from charges that it’s just a friendlier rebranding of propaganda. The growing usage of the internet and digital tools for achieving foreign policy or diplomatic goals has brought a fresh set of concerns to the table. How much should governments, diplomats, and public officials be engaging with audiences on these tools? Should the message be shifting to a more “clickbait” style? On the ever expanding web where getting your message heard is half the battle, is the use of tools to artificially inflate engagement just part of the game? For example, some public diplomacy professionals have proposed creating our own army of “good” bots to battle the noise and ensure a robust online information space (Hwang 2017, 30). In figuring out the problem of Russian information operations, as well as how best to counter it, public diplomacy has to grapple with questions of whether using similar tools and methods are justifiable means to an end.

Understanding Russian information operations is important for the field of public diplomacy, and we need to rethink our way of approaching and discussing the issue. At the Milton Wolf Seminar, we explored a few different cases that exemplified the diversity of Russian information operations. Igor Rozkladaj discussed Ukraine’s active and ongoing fight against Russian propaganda, and Mona Elswah presented some of the research she has been doing through Oxford’s computational propaganda project on the role of Russian bots in Brexit. Complementing my own presentation at the seminar, the next section will discuss an overlooked aspect of Russian information operations by focusing on two Baltic states, Estonia and Latvia. The final section will propose methods of public diplomacy that can be used to counter Russian influence and information operations in the states.

Russian Information Operations in Estonia and Latvia

Russia seeks to maintain a zone of privileged interest in the Baltic states, and often uses the large proportions of Russian speakers and ethnic Russian minorities as political pawns in its efforts to stir tensions between ethnic groups and destabilize the governments of its neighbors. According to research from Albany Associates, the proportion of ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia is about 24% and 27% of the general population, while the amount of Russian speakers is around 30% and 34%, respectively (Barojan and Gabriel 2016). The reason why these numbers are problematic in Estonia and Latvia traces back to Soviet policies of russification, where the indigenous Latvian and Estonian languages were marginalized as minority languages in their own republics. This created the perception of the need to protect the “weaker” Estonian and Latvian languages and identity, especially after independence was gained and these states sought to forge new identities (Pavlenko 2011, 50). As a result, Estonian and Latvian nationalization policy after independence was based on being a citizen, or direct descendent of a citizen, of the pre-war Estonian and Latvian republics (Aasland 2002, 57). Most Russian residents were excluded from these categories, resulting in large amounts of statelessness. This issue of citizenship, often framed in terms of civil rights and ethnic discrimination, constitutes one of Russia’s primary humanitarian concerns in Estonia and Latvia exploited in their influence operations.

Russian information and influence operations in Estonia and Latvia take the multipronged approach that was discussed in the previous section. There has been an erosion of public trust in state institutions and traditional media sources across the majority of nations, and Estonia and Latvia are not exceptions to this trend. Russian information operations seek to take advantage of this new paradigm by overloading the information space with pro-Kremlin narratives in order to sow confusion, discontent, division, and further distrust in the government and other traditional sources of authority (Walker 2018, 83). Two of the traditional culprits of disinformation are the international news arms of the Kremlin, RT and Sputnik, which have recently seen dramatic increases in funding and expansion of operations (Rawnsley 2015, 278). Perhaps with an even broader reach are Estonia and Latvia’s Russian-language local media with Kremlin connections. For example, the most popular Russian-language television outlets in Latvia are First Baltic Channel, RTR, and NTV Mir, all of which are connected either directly or indirectly to the Kremlin (Kudors 2014, 87-88).  Lastly, disinformation on these media outlets is often supplemented by information campaigns of Russian NGOs and GONGOs (government-organized non-governmental organizations) such as the Russkii Mir Foundation and Rossotrudnichetsvo (Zeleneva and Ageevna 2017, 185). This has created the reality of a polarized information space in Estonia and Latvia where public opinion of Russian-speakers is at risk of being manipulated by Kremlin media, threatening to undermine support for democracy and European institutions. These information operations are supplemented with the co-option of political and economic networks. The Harmony Center alliance in Latvia and the Estonia Center Party in Estonia are two primary examples of where Russia directs political financing in order to support the adoption of Kremlin-friendly policies (Zeleneva and Ageevna 2017, 184). Economically, the Baltics—like much of Europe—are dependent on Russia for gas and oil, and Russia is simultaneously dependent on them for their market. Russia also has a large degree of business and banking penetration in the Baltics, particularly in Latvia (Grigas 2012, 3). In Estonia and Latvia there is an ongoing war to wage influence over the Russian-speaking populations, where disinformation abounds through polarized media spaces and is supplemented by corrupt networks of politicians and businessmen.

The narratives put forth through Russian information operations are often emotionally charged and targeted at specific cultural tensions or traumas. An ongoing issue in both Latvia and Estonia, for example, involves the ability for schoolchildren to receive an education in Russia. Recognizing language as an essential component of national identity, the Russian position has been that Russian-speaking students have the right to receive an education in their native language and the denial of this right represents a human rights abuse. Pavlenko (2011) notes the emergence of a discourse of “language rights” within the information space, comprised dually of moralistic vocabulary of “protection” to frame the Russian state as a positive force and savior, while also comprised of vocabulary of violence (e.g. “language genocide” and “language murder”) to negatively characterize the practices of the Baltic states (49). Looking at a few recent news articles on Russian-language news sites based in the Baltic states, it is not difficult to find examples of this. One article referred to Latvia’s education reforms as bringing about the “liquidation of the future of the Russian community.” Another forewarned that the adoption of these amendments would mean “the destruction of school education in the Russian language.” A final example sanctioned the use of violent rhetoric like “killing” and “murder,” featuring an interview with the creator of protest posters that referred to education reforms as the “Holocaust of Russian education”. These examples illustrate how the narratives of Russian disinformation are often emotionally charged, misleading, and threaten the integrity of states and prospects at peaceful relations with their people. The information space in Estonia and Latvia is polarized due to divisions between Estonian, Latvian, and Russian-language media sources, and more efforts need to be undertaken to engage with the Russian-speaking populations in a trustworthy media form in order to combat Russian disinformation.

Using Public Diplomacy to Counter Russian Disinformation

Although the Estonian and Latvian states have both undertaken measures to ease citizenship requirements and reduce the numbers of stateless residents, the issue continues to persist and impact the daily lives of many Russian residents in these countries. Considering Russian disinformation often involves a demonization of the US, the EU, and NATO, it could be beneficial for the image of these entities if public officials and governing bodies make visible calls for improvements in the situation. Obviously the public diplomacy should not just be limited to calls for action on Twitter. A tangible campaign of some sort should be started that actually engages with the Russian populations and figures out how best to help them. These should be joint efforts of engagement that involve both the domestic governments and other international bodies.

Efforts to disprove and combat disinformation also need to be bolstered. NATO and the EU both have their own methods. The EU has the East StratCom Task Force, which has developed the EU vs Disinfo campaign, and NATO has the NATO Stratcom Centre of Excellence. The US-based Center for European Policy Analysis, which receives some funding through the Department of Defense and the State Department, has also developed the CEPA Stratcom Program. The quality of these organizations and the work they produce is not the issue—engagement and reach are the bigger concerns. Collectively, these organizations have about 55k followers on twitter. While these organizations do offer publications in Russian and other target languages, the bulk of their presence seems to be in English. These are meager numbers, and most of the audience is likely a self-selected population of foreign affairs experts or military personnel who are already aware of the extent of Russia’s disinformation operations. To engage with the audiences that need it most these organizations should boost their number of publications in foreign target languages and distribute these publications on wider platforms. Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube should all be used to their fullest extents. Podcasts with viewer questions might be another avenue to consider.

Alongside widening the reach of the truth, the general narrative of most stories needs a shift. Truth is important, but the past week of May 27th has seen the EU vs Disinfo site headlined with stories about MH17—an issue that is distant from the minds and concerns of most Russian speakers. The reality of the internet is that publications with some kind of emotional triggering tend to gather more clicks. Western public diplomacy needs to have an emotive shift without also betraying our dedications to truth and core standards of journalism. Occupy Wall Street and Alexei Navalny’s anti-corruption protests have shown corruption can be one of these emotive issues, so perhaps a starting point would be investigative journalism and reports into Russian kleptocratic networks and how the money is being spent.

Lastly, as one of the goals of Western public diplomacy is to maintain an open and competitive marketplace of information, there should be more joint initiatives to fund independent news sources in target languages that promote truthful stories. Funding competitions could be held to distribute grants and encourage truth on multiple platforms—YouTube, blogging, and traditional news publications. Multipronged efforts need a multipronged response.

A challenge Western public diplomacy is facing is adapting to the sheer scope of Russian disinformation without also compromising our values and integrity. Of course, these methods require more money and resources in order to be realized. But when the disruption of liberal democracies is at the other end of the balance sheet, the costs seem to be a worthwhile investment.

Works Cited

Aasland, Aadne. 2002. “Citizenship Status and Social Exclusion in Estonia and Latvia.” Journal of Baltic Studies 33, no. 1: 57-77.

Barojan, Donara and Guy Gabriel. 2016. “Talking Russian: Minority Politics and the Putin Doctrine in the Baltic States.” Albany Associates, 24th March 2016.

Grigas, Agnia. 2012. “Legacies, Coercion and Soft Power: Russian Influence in the Baltic States.” Chatham House Briefing Paper: The Means and Ends of Russian Influence Abroad: 1-16.

Hwang, Tim. (2017). “Rethinking Countermeasures in the Age of Computational Propaganda.” In Can Public Diplomacy Survive the Internet? Bots, Echo Chambers, and Disinformation. Edited by Shawn Powers and Markos Kounalakis, 27-34.

Kudors, Andis. 2014. “Russian Soft Power and Non-Military Influence: The View from Latvia.” In Tools of Destabilization: Russian Soft Power and Non-Military Influence in the Baltic States.” Edited by Mike Winnerstig. 71-112.

Pavlenko, Aneta. 2011. “Language Rights Versus Speakers’ Rights: On the Applicability of Western Language Rights Approaches in Eastern European Contexts.” Language Policy 10, no. 1: 37-58.

Rawnsley, Gary. 2015. “To Know Us is to Love Us: Public Diplomacy and International Broadcasting in Contemporary Russia and China.” Politics 35, no. 3-4: 273-286.

Rozenvalds, Juris. 2016. “Integration in Latvia: Ebbs and Flows in National and European Context.” CBU International Conference Proceedings 4: 403-407

Zeleneva, Irina and Vera Ageevna. 2017. “Russia’s Soft Power in the Baltics: Media, Education and Russian World Narrative.” Media Education no. 4: 181-188.

Walker, Vivian. 2017. “Crafting Resilient State Narratives in Post Truth Environments: Ukraine and Georgia,” in Can Public Diplomacy Survive the Internet? Edited by Shawn Powers and Markos Kounalakis, 83-89.

Winnerstig, Mike, ed. 2014. “Executive Summary” and “Introduction.” In Tools of Destabilization: Russian Soft Power and Non-military Influence in the Baltic States: 10-17.