Civil Society or Civil Service? Exploring the “Network model” of Public Diplomacy

‘Can public diplomacy survive the Internet?’ the US State Department was left wondering in May last year (Powers & Kounalakis, 2017). This soul-searching arose from several turbulent years in which liberal democracies have struggled to grapple with disinformation campaigns, data harvesting, cyberattacks and “fake news,” both domestically and globally, whilst remaining consistent with democratic values. While these threats are not entirely novel, the rapid advancement of communication technologies has placed many governments on the back foot, highlighted by the clear gaps in legislators’ technical understanding revealed at Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s recent Congressional testimony.

Discussion at the 2018 Milton Wolf Seminar interrogated these issues from a range of technological and geographical perspectives–from Facebook, print media and UN Charters to Russia, North Korea, and Syria.  Alongside the evolution of informational threats, participants also explored a number of potential countermeasures, including media literacy initiatives, community self-regulation and localized narratives.  At their core, the proposals all implied a fundamental need to build societies that are resilient to misinformation and authoritarian narratives, a theme which reoccurred throughout the seminar.

Yet the imperative for international resilience is complicated by an enduring climate of mistrust exacerbated by the current media environment. Trust is declining in governments, media organizations and businesses worldwide. As institutions are perceived as increasingly impotent against the complex flows of globalization, levels of trust are at record lows. Global communications firm Edelman named 2017 the year of “trust in crisis” after conducting their annual international Trust Barometer, with governments consistently emerging as the least trusted institutions (Edelman 2017). Plenty has been written on the supposed existential crisis of public diplomacy. It is, however, reasonable to assume that public diplomacy initiatives aimed at establishing resilient, media literate societies are in some way compromised by this pervasive mistrust in government and media institutions. How might states overcome such attitudes?

The 'Network Model' of Public Diplomacy

Over the course of the seminar, several speakers put forward a case for a ‘multistakeholder’ model of diplomacy, in which governments collaborate with ‘non-state’ agents such as civil society organizations. While these presentations focused primarily on the key role of civil society organizations in Internet governance, these concepts have also been applied to diplomacy and governance more broadly, leading to a reconfiguration in understandings of ‘public diplomacy’. Brian Hocking (2008) identifies the emergence of two divergent definitions within the discourse. The first remains closely tied to the traditional understanding of diplomacy as a hierarchical and intergovernmental process. The other, referred to as the ‘network model’, understands public diplomacy in the wider context of highly complex international policy networks. In this conceptualization, publics and civil society are ‘partners in and producers of diplomatic processes’ (Hocking, 2008, 62).

Of particular significance is the framing of this debate in terms of efficacy and trust. Their perceived prioritization of “citizen interests” over “national interests” allows civil society organizations to claim to a ‘legitimacy’ that is unavailable to governments. This critical distance from government policy, combined with knowledge and expertise that may surpass states in certain areas, has resulted in such actors being dubbed “practitioners par excellence” of public diplomacy (La Porte, 2012). Joseph Nye, who coined the term ‘soft power’ so ubiquitous in public diplomacy rhetoric, also stressed the need for “an understanding of the role of credibility, self-criticism, and the role of civil society in generating soft power (2008).” In this approach, collaboration with the third sector represents a potential solution to the challenges faced by states as a consequence of trust deficits and a climate of disinformation and mistrust. Civil society actors are characterized as a legitimizing presence in the international system.

There is evidence that governments are beginning to endorse the network model. The US State Department declared a key policy goal was to ‘strengthen support of civil society and protect an open Internet’ in its 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. ‘In an era of diffuse and networked power’, reads the executive summary, ‘our diplomats must focus on strengthening partnerships with civil society […] who share our values’ (Powers & Kounalakis, 2017, 9). In 2006, the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office appointed a former senior Oxfam official as “strategic stakeholder manager,” charged with developing a set of structures and strategies for engagement with NGOs and other stakeholders. On a multilateral level, both the UN and the European Union have actively promoted cooperation with civil society among its members.

Civil Society or Civil Servants

Despite increasing enthusiasm for this approach, relationships between states and civil society are complex and deserve further unpacking. Firstly, it is necessary to acknowledge the broad spectrum of attitudes towards third sector organizations, who receiving varying amounts of support (or suppression). Authoritarian states, for example, tend to enact repressive measures against independent civil society organizations, interpreted as a threat to their sovereignty. This phenomenon is not limited to authoritarian governments As Sultan Nazrin Shah of Perak recognized in a recent speech urging diplomats to work with civil society organizations, ‘things can get uncomfortable when governments become sensitive to critical scrutiny by assertive and vocal NGOs’ (Ahmad, 2017).  On the surface, this critical dynamic may appear to undermine the case for third sector collaboration in public diplomacy initiatives.

However, the interests of civil society and government are not necessarily incompatible. Civil society can be understood as the organized cultural expression of a given society or nation. If culture and national identity are inherently linked, it follows that there is a nationalistic element to some civil society organizations (even if this is not explicitly conceptualized as ‘nation’). This relationship is underexplored, yet it could be argued that civilian cultural organizations in fact play an integral role in upholding governmental structures. In a lecture at Stanford University, Michel Foucault made a distinction between the centralized power of the state, deriving from bureaucracy and force, and ‘individualizing power’: cultural phenomena such as collective organization which is ‘orientated towards individuals and intended to rule them in a continuous and permanent way’ (1979, 227). In this model both categories, which can be seen as the conceptual predecessors of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power, serve the function of sustaining governance. From a public diplomacy perspective, the Alliance Française- originally a private organization created for the benefit of France- is just one example of the potential alignment of government and civil society organizations. Therefore, somewhat paradoxically, civil society can be seen to simultaneously question the authority of the state while also promoting and protecting its power.

Of course, the term ‘civil society’ is used to encompass an extremely large and diverse group of organizations, which goes part way to explain this ambiguity. The tension also challenges an assumption that is often made that all civil society organizations will promote liberal values. Due to the capacity of civil society organizations to establish resilient, just and democratically healthy societies, discussed above, there is an enduring belief that fostering their growth internationally will result in nations and societies converging with Western liberal democracies. There is ample evidence that this is not the case: take, for example, the Facebook campaigns of overseas religious anti-abortion groups in the run up to the upcoming referendum on abortion in Ireland. There is also an imperative to interrogate the legitimacy of the organizations themselves. Legitimacy forms the basis of recognition of diplomatic actors, yet civil society organizations have no democratic mandate to intervene in international affairs. In practice, this recognition is often derived from elsewhere- public support, transparency, or charitable aims to name a few- and civil society is an integral part of democratic societies. However, any public diplomacy initiative is immediately undermined if a partner organization were to be perceived, for example, to be corrupt, ‘inauthentic’ or harboring an ‘alternative agenda’. Policy-makers should consider whether the values and behaviors of the third sector groups they collaborate with and support align with their own.

In a similar vein, Kristina Stoeckl gave an illuminating presentation at this year’s Milton Wolf seminar regarding Russia’s use of transnational civil society in its desire to present itself as ‘the only defender of Christian values’ and create value-orientated divisions within the UN. Her particular focus was on the ‘Protection of the Family’ resolution to the United Nations Human Rights Council, which refers to the family as the ‘natural and fundamental group unit of society and entitled to protection by society and the State’. In practice, the resolution was intended as a statement of opposition to gay rights, gender equality and abortion, among other ‘non-traditional’ familial modes. It emerged as part of a campaign by Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church and a coalition of conservative civil society groups such as the World Congress of Families. Stoeckl’s presentation therefore highlighted the complex dynamics of ‘network diplomacy’, through the mobilization of transnational civil society in pursuit of Russian foreign policy objectives and a conservatism that does not correspond to the third sector diplomacy of the Western imagination.

Concerns surrounding legitimacy, value alignment or criticism could persuade governments to take a tightly monitored approach to working with non-state actors. This raises another dilemma. The impulse to control, or the ‘gatekeeper’ mindset as Hocking names it, can in fact diminish the efficacy of public diplomacy practices. Returning to the legitimacy debate, if civil society organisations are understood as little more than government puppets, any of the aforementioned benefits arising from their ‘independent’ status are withdrawn. What’s more, close proximity of state and civil society leaves genuine protest movements vulnerable to claims of foreign meddling. For example, Putin and pro-Russian Ukrainians declared that the protests in Kiev were be ‘orchestrated by foreign forces through puppet CSOs’ (CAF, 2017). Ultimately, this comes down to a differentiation between ‘collaboration with’ and ‘instrumentalization of’ non-state actors. Although it could be claimed these are mere linguistic distinctions, as has been said of the terms ‘public diplomacy’ and ‘propaganda’, this is of secondary importance to whether or not the public in question perceive a difference.

The 2018 Milton Wolf Seminar addressed a ‘transformative moment’ in international information diplomacy, with particular focus on the threat brought my misinformation campaigns. This blog considers the way that the network model of public diplomacy responds to this shift, especially in relation to issues of legitimacy and trust. An ambiguous picture emerges, one in which third sector collaboration can be both potent and precarious. States seeking collaboration with domestic organizations are faced with the tasks of identifying appropriate stakeholders, making judgements on alignment of values, and maintaining a perceptible operational distance. Governments promoting the development of civil society overseas must be wary that this may produce a result that is counterproductive to their foreign policy goals.

While this may appear to be a difficult balance to strike, the diplomatic environment is changing and will continue to do so. States who fail to adapt new diplomatic practice are at risk of being left behind. Despite the risks, third sector collaboration or ‘network’ diplomacy offers many opportunities to legitimate and streamline foreign policy. Executed well, working alongside such organisations has potential to renew credibility and trust in public diplomacy. However, as has become clear, this is only possible if conducted in a sophisticated and considered manner.

Works Cited

Ahmad, R. (2017) ‘Work with NGOs, Sultan Nazrin urges diplomats’, The Star, Thursday 13 July.

Charities Aid Foundation (2017), ‘From Soft to Brittle: US Diplomacy, Democracy and Civil Society’.

Edelman, R. (2017) Edelman Trust Barometer.

Foucault, M. (1979) ‘Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism’, Stanford University, October 10/16, 1979 in McMurrin, S. Human Values, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.

Graham-Harrison, E. (2018), ‘Revealed: the overseas anti-abortion activists using Facebook to target Irish voters’, The Observer, 12 May.

Hocking, B. (2008). Reconfiguring Public Diplomacy: From Competition to Collaboration, Clingendal, May.

La Porte, T. (2012) ‘The Legitimacy and Effectiveness of Non‐State Actors and the Public Diplomacy Concept’, Public Diplomacy Theory and Conceptual Issues, ISA Annual Convention, San Diego, April 1‐4, 2012.

Luke, T. W, ‘The Arts, Culture, and Civil Society: Power Stations in the Grids of Governance’ in Singh, J. (2010) International cultural policies and power, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Nye, J. (2008). Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616:1, 94-109.

Powers, S. & Kounlakis, M. (2017) Can Public Diplomacy Survive the Internet? Bots, Echo Chambers & Disinformation, United States Department of State, May.