Emerging Hegemonies and the Legacy of the Marshall Plan

Yuval Katz is one of the ten 2017 Milton Wolf Emerging Scholar Fellows, an accomplished group of law, doctoral and advanced MA candidates selected to attend the 2017 Milton Wolf Seminar. Their posts highlight the critical themes and on-going debates raised during the 2017 Seminar discussions.

Seventy years after George C. Marshall addressed the graduating class of Harvard University and proposed his famous plan to help reconstruct Europe following the devastation of World War II, a group of diplomats and scholars met at the 2017 Milton Wolf Seminar in Vienna to reconsider historical implications of the plan. Discussions focused on two perspectives; the actual implementation of the original plan and its role as a conceptual framework for imagining new global or regional orders. The seminar paid close attention to the role of communication in these processes, since hegemons establish their dominance in the international system through the media. They try to convince both governments and peoples in their areas of influence that their presence is vital for their prosperity.

Indeed, the first two sessions of the seminar, focusing on the original Marshall Plan, were telling because they revealed the enormous efforts invested by the U.S. government in selling the plan to the Europeans. These efforts were not limited to governments; a lot of work was put into convincing the local population that the plan was important for them. Ellwood (1998; 2006) points out that countries that joined the plan and signed the ERP (the European Recovery Plan), also conceded to the dissemination of information and news about the plan within their borders. This clause in the plan later developed into the largest propaganda campaign in the twentieth century taking place at a time of peace.

The goals of the Marshall Plan were far more ambitious than a mere reconstruction of infrastructure or restoration of functioning economies. It aimed to modernize and industrialize European countries and push them towards integration, in a way that is reminiscent of the American union. Accordingly, the Marshall Plan held a promise to Europeans that “You Too Can Be like Us”, explicitly revealing the American intent to recreate Europe in its own image. Hence, films, radio shows and pamphlets were vital for conveying this vision. For example, films broadcasted in Western Germany portrayed the progress and liberty spurred by the plan, extoling Europeans as intelligent and strong. Simultaneously, it was clear that Europeans relied on American benevolence to achieve this sense of self-worth (Schröder, 2009).

This drive to leave a lasting mark on Europe in the late 1940s and early 1950s was not coincidental. It was particularly important given the growing hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union that developed into the Cold War. Soon, Ideological identification was insufficient; the Korean War, the first major military clash between the Western and Eastern blocs, which broke out in June 1950, demanded European countries to show a much more active support for their respective superpowers. Austria was a good example for a propaganda war waging between the East and the West. The country’s status in the end of World War II was initially similar to Germany, since it was also dissected into four occupation zones controlled by the United Kingdom, France, the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the Allied powers agreed that Austria would remain an independent state, which meant that contrary to Germany, it did not split (Eisterer, 2009).

The competition on people’s opinions became paramount in Austria because it was the only Eastern European country participating in the Marshall Plan. In addition, it received the highest support per capita in comparison to other countries participating in the plan. The United States was not the only one investing resources in appealing to local people. Stelzl-Marx (2009) illustrates how the Soviet Union, with the help of the Austrian Communist Party, used its own propaganda to argue against the “Marshallization” of Austria; it portrayed the plan as a sophisticated mechanism whose goal was to enrich Western Germany and the United States at the expense of Austria, resulting in a new type of Anschluss. Contrarily, the Soviets claimed that they would be able to bring prosperity to the country by providing high quality goods and increasing local purchasing power.

Examining the implementation of the Marshall Plan in Europe and in Austria in particular illustrate the importance of soft power (Nye, 2009). Moving beyond the quantifiable metrics of military or economic power commonly used in realpolitik, like the number of nuclear warheads or GDP, soft power is conceived as an influence on people through an ongoing shaping of their preferences. It is an attractive or seductive power, which leads those whom you wish to influence to do what you want without applying any form of coercion. Consequently, a perceived congruence between the values and norms of the influenced and the influencer is central to the success of soft power.

A particularly interesting question is what happens when several rival hegemons try to influence the same area by using their soft power? Such inquiry can be evasive; in absence of clear measures, how can we tell why one propaganda works while the other fails? Specifically, why did the Marshall Plan successfully appealed to the Austrian people while Soviet propaganda failed? In the case of the Cold War, it is easy to turn to ideology and say that American values were simply more attractive (Nye, 2009). However, the active role of the Communist party in Austrian politics during this period and its attempts to establish a People’s Democracy like the rest of Eastern Europe (Bader, 1966) suggest that the Austrian people was offered a strong counter-narrative that resisted the American-capitalist propaganda.

A possible explanation can be found in the material basis underlying propaganda on both sides. The United States was consistently offering aid to Austria and trying to rebuild its economy, even if there were clear political and ideological motivations for its actions. The Soviets, on the other hand, began their military presence in Austria with a demand for compensation. Being the country that suffered most loses during the war, and seeing Austria as a close collaborator with the German enemy, the Soviets confiscated entire firms that were considered “German property” soon after the war ended. While Soviet actions may be morally justifiable, it is unsurprising that such interactions with the Red Army soon led Austrians to establish an image of “bad Russians” and “good Americans” (Stelzl-Marx, 2009).

The Austrian case has important implications on our understanding of soft power. It is true that hard power is often insufficient for generating profound influence; the hegemon needs to offer a set norms and values that generate a moral common ground from which relationships between influencer and influenced can grow over time. However, the opposite is also true; soft power would not work if a country’s military or economic policies imply that its arguments are biased or hypocritical. In other words, it is not enough to talk about morality or advocate a certain ideology; a country must show that it is acting in accordance with its own standards if it wishes to increase its soft power and influence public opinions in other countries.

This problem becomes highly relevant in the current international system, as new actors try to seize the place of the United States since its hegemonic influence seems to be declining. The Milton Wolf Seminar held panels on three potential challengers to American dominance: Russia, China and Iran. Russia is seemingly the ultimate global citizen, due to its expressed support for the United Nations and international law. However, what Russia says is not necessarily what it does; for example, after scrutinizing the United States in the fall of 2013 for its involvement in Syria, it later intervened in the country to save Assad’s regime. According to Lo (2015), Russia’s problems do not end with its hypocrisy. It unable to adjust to a “new world disorder” in which the great powers find it difficult to cohere their opinions on weaker states. In addition, since few countries see Russia as a major contributor to international public goods, it is unlikely it will become a world leader.

In China, one strategy intended to promote the country’s status as a global power is the “One Belt, One Road” project. Unveiled by the Chinese president Xi Jinping in 2013, the project includes both a land and a maritime road based on the historic Silk Road, which will eventually connect 100 countries in Asia, Africa and Europe. The purpose of the project is to promote an alternative, China-led mode of global economic integration nicknamed “Chi-globalization”. The project emphasizes investment in underdeveloped countries; one of its most communicated aspects is the building of telecommunication infrastructure and provide media content that will “improve global connectivity” and the magnitude of global trade. In response to claims that the project resembles the Marshall Plan, Xinhua, the Chinese governmental news agency explicitly stated that: “While the Marshall Plan excluded communist countries and escalated the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West, China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiatives are open to all countries that want peace and development” (quoted in Swane, 2015, p. 11).

The Chinese depiction of “One Belt, One Road” as s completely altruistic project is not entirely convincing. Some observers note that the actual purpose of the project is to marginalize Europe on the one hand and isolate the United States on the other (Rolland, 2015). Indeed, Chinese soft power and its ability to communicate it to the world through such ambitious projects are debatable. While making enormous efforts to project a positive image of a peaceful and developed country, China still suffers from a legitimacy problem, particularly in the West, due to its strong ties to dictatorships and lack of democratic values in its domestic politics (Gill & Huang, 2006).

The last contender to the hegemonic throne that was discussed in the seminar is Iran. Contrary to Russia or China, who seek hegemonic power through cultural, economic or diplomatic efforts, while trying to avoid public clashes with the American hegemon, Iran had to confront the United States directly in recent years, particularly around its nuclear program (e.g., Izadi & Saghaye-Biria, 2007; Jones, 2014). However, Iran is also trying to use convert methods to challenge current power relations in the international system, by adopting non-linear stratagems of warfare, like cyber-attacks. These allow the Iranians carry out attacks against their enemies while maintaining an ability to deny their existence (Hagh & Majizadeh, 2017).

Meanwhile, Iran tries to establish itself as a regional hegemon and set new rules of diplomatic engagement with the West. Mouhammad Zarif, the Iranian Foreign Minister, named this policy “engagement with dignity” (Gordon, 2015), which means that countries that used to be influenced by Western colonialism would no longer be acquiescent to its wills. Iran contends that these countries should voice their opinions and insist on keeping their national interests. Thus, only when mutual respect is maintained and discussions take place on equal grounds, can there be a dignified engagement between the West and its former colonies. In this context, Iran emphasizes the importance of sovereignty, pointing out that countries should not interfere with others’ internal affairs (Press TV, 2017). However, such arguments put Iran in a problematic position, for it is well known that it intervenes with numerous countries in the Middle East, including Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. Therefore, several countries in the region, like Saudi Arabia, perceive Iran as a threat rather than a potential leader (Chubin & Tripp, 2004).

Seventy years after the initiation of the Marshall Plan and its rare success in establishing a new political order in Europe after the devastation of World War II, it is interesting to consider whether similar plans can be conceived in the current international system with similar effects. From the perspective of emerging hegemons that might lead these plans, utilizing soft power as a part of their efforts is key; in the current global media environment, countries know that in order to become leaders they must project a positive image to the world. While images and their management are important, the discussions held at the Milton Wolf Seminar also raised the need to think about the material aspect of foreign affairs, manifested through diplomatic, economic and military conduct, as an essential basis for positive images. The fact that China, Russia and Iran are not full democracies, in addition to their problematic reputation and the reluctance of weak states to do as they are told in the current international system (Lo & Ševcova, 2012), raise serious doubts about their ability to become the new hegemons in the international system.

References

Bader, W. (1966). Austria between East and West, 1945-1955. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Chubin, S. & Tripp, C. (2004). Iran-Saudi Arabic relations and regional order. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Eisterer, K. (2009). Austria under Allied occupation. In R. Steininger, G. Bischof & M. Gehler (Eds.), Austria in the twentieth century (pp. 190-211). New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers. 

Ellwood, D. (1998). ‘You can too be like us’: Selling the Marshall Plan. History Today, 48(10), 33-39.

Ellwood, D. (2006). The Marshall Plan A Strategy That Worked.  Foreign Policy Agenda, 17-25.

Gill, B., & Huang, Y. (2006). Sources and limits of Chinese ‘soft power’. Survival, 48(2), 17-36.

Gordon, M. (2015). Latest Iran talks end without a deal. New York Times.

Hagh, A & Majidzadeh, P. (2017). Non-Linear Stratagems in Theory and Practice: Examples from Iranian Cyber Policies. Iran Media Research Project.

Izadi, F., & Saghaye-Biria, H. (2007). A discourse analysis of elite American newspaper editorials: The case of Iran’s nuclear program. Journal of Communication Inquiry, 31(2), 140-165.

Jones, P. (2014). US–Iran Nuclear Track Two from 2005 to 2011: What Have We Learned? Where Are We Going?. Negotiation Journal, 30(4), 347-366.

Lo, B., & Ševcova, L. F. (2012). A 21st Century Myth: Authoritarian Modernization in Russia and China. Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center.

Lo, B. (2015). Russia and the new world disorder. London: Chatham House; Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Nye, J. (2009). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. New York: Public Affairs.

Press TV. (2017). Rouhani urges respect for states’ sovereignty in meeting with Erdogan.

Rolland, N. (2015). China’s new Silk Road. The National Bureau of Asian Research.

Schröder, H. J. (2009). Visualizing the Marshall Plan in Western Germany: Films, exhibits, posters. In G. Bischof & D. Stiefel (Eds.), Images of the Marshall Plan in Europe: Films, photographs, exhibits, posters (pp. 69-86). New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers.

Stelzl-Marx, B. (2009). The Marshall Plan dead ends and anti-USIA campaigns: The Soviet economic propaganda campaign in Austria. In  G. Bischof & D. Stiefel (Eds.), Images of the Marshall Plan in Europe: Films, photographs, exhibits, posters (pp. 117-128). New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers.

Swaine, M. D. (2015). Chinese views and commentary on the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative. China Leadership Monitor, 47, 1-24.

About the Author

Yuval Katz is a PhD student at University of Michigan’s Department of Communication Studies. He is interested in the formulation of meaning and its role in different processes of communication. His research inspects how politically active Jews and Arabs use social media to conceptualize peace in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He is also interested in instances in which meanings fail by looking at nonsense in digital memes. He holds a B.A. in International Relations and Communication Studies and an M.A. in Communication and New Media Studies from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Currently he is also working on a poetry book entitled “Sous Chef Sushi Samurai”.